-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 Meyer wrote:

Or how about this one: enticing people interested in developing cryptography into an closed system based in Canada (international, so using full-blown Echelon technology against it isn't a problem)

...

Except for the pesky fact that the NSA can't spy on US citizens, even if they're in Canada. (Exceptions can be made, but the hoops become higher and more numerous than a simple FBI investigation.)

True, but if a communication involves "information relevant to a matter of national security" and crosses national borders, US citizens are fair game. - From what little I've seen about it, it seems like if someone decided it was worth the effort to intercept all private communications about remailers and crypto, the language is ambiguous enough to allow for a pretty large loophole. So setting up shop in Canada might do the trick, unfortunately. Back to remailers: this might have a boneheadedly obvious answer, but is there a role for non-publicized privately-run remailer networks to serve as a "privacy buffer" before putting messages thorugh the public remailer system? For example, if I had the hardware, software, phone lines, internet connections and time to run multiple autonomous mixmaster remailers out of my basement to route my own messages (and dummy traffic) around before funneling them to a public remailer, would there be any way to keep all-but-the-last box entirely shut off from view? Could you achieve this degree of anonymity from running Reliable? What would it take to keep a private remailer network truly private? Not that I really expect anyone to talk about it here, but it's an interesting set of questions to mentally kick around, at any rate. Maybe a link to a white paper or two would put me out of my misery. ;) And what about the idea of surreptitiously installing this kind of private remailer network via piggybacking a stripped-down highly-anonymous version of remailer software onto other people's badly-maintained networks--free POP accounts to hold the traffic, maybe along with some sort of remote administration tool for maintenance. A tiny trickle of traffic has all the obvious problems, but is it possible that a "single user" scheme like this might be sufficiently under the radar to go completely unnoticed? Little invisible pinprick remailers that pop up all over the place, and dissappear almost as fast as they spring up. Mosquito Remailers? Just a thought. Nothing but 100% hot air on my part, but I hope somebody finds something interesting enough here to take it and run with it. ~Faustine. p.s...and yes, I'm off to "Go Read the Archives"TM. *** As nightfall does not come at once, neither does oppression....There is a twilight when everything remains seemingly unchanged. And it is in such a twilight that we must be most aware of change in the air however slight lest we become unwitting victims of the darkness. - --William O. Douglas, Associate Justice, US Supreme Court -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: PGPsdk version 1.7.1 (C) 1997-1999 Network Associates, Inc. and its affiliated companies. (Diffie-Helman/DSS-only version) iQA/AwUBPBgIjPg5Tuca7bfvEQLJQQCg65fZ5m4aYB52m9KAAt4Rc2TigFIAniMX v9FXN+TynvB6R9QifnWkq1+S =F5yb -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----