-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- This is a longer response to the warning posted by Xavier.
Beware of the message about the security bug in the anon.penet.fi software!
Indeed.
If you do as requested, and send your true email address to an5877@anon.penet.fi then he will see both your true email address and your anonymous address (if you have one - if you don't, you will be assigned one and he will see that). Any future use you make of this anonymous server (say, to post anonymously) will appear under that same anonymous address - and this person will know your true email address that goes with it.
You got me. I meant only slight malice here: I had intended to "expose" a few email/anon associations to highlight the problem. The problem became apparent to me when I sent pseudonymous mail to a prominent person on this list; his reply exposed his pseudonymous id at anon.penet.fi, surely without his knowledge.
an5877's message appears to be a trick, designed to collect anonymous/real address pairs. Johan Helsingius should take action against this trickster. Since he is learning other people's real addresses, perhaps it would be appropriate for his own real address to be revealed.
Now that would be a _very_ serious "bug" in the anon.penet.fi remailer (or, more accurately, in its administration); I am confident Johan Helsingius will reject this suggestion.
But, this does point out that these systems which automatically assign anonymous addrsses have several security flaws. Johan has already had to introduce a "password" feature to make it more difficult to send fakemail that appears to be from a particular email address through the server, thus revealing the corresponding anonymous address when it is delivered.
I think that merely masks the real problem.
an5877's trick is a variant on one discussed in news.admin.policy where it is pointed out that you can mail to someone via anon.penet.fi and ask for information; when the return mail comes back it will be from that person's anonymous address. So again you can pair up real and anonymous addresses.
I missed that discussion, or I wouldn't have wasted your (our) time.
These are serious problems. We need some discussion of how to avoid these simple tricks for defeating the anonymity while still having an easy-to-use system.
Any ideas? For starters, I think the default behavior of anon.penet.fi is badly broken. But a more serious problem with anon.penet.fi and the other remailers I am aware of is the necessity that we pseudonymous clients have to rely on the integrity of their administrators to keep our pseudonyms private. In the face of social pressure, such as Xavier's, that may be asking a lot.
::Xavier::
DEADBEAT -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.1 iQBFAgUBK4lr4/FZTpBW/B35AQGqeAF/UBefmNprQacueYazdvhAKMF4nA+2vl44 /+FMACnWjd7yaoG99VeyhO/S6vptT1UB =yZRb -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- ------------------------------------------------------------------------- To find out more about the anon service, send mail to help@anon.penet.fi. Due to the double-blind system, any replies to this message will be anonymized, and an anonymous id will be allocated automatically. You have been warned. Please report any problems, inappropriate use etc. to admin@anon.penet.fi. *IMPORTANT server security update*, mail to update@anon.penet.fi for details.
I meant only slight malice here: I had intended to "expose" a few email/anon associations to highlight the problem. The problem became apparent to me when I sent pseudonymous mail to a prominent person on this list; his reply exposed his pseudonymous id at anon.penet.fi, surely without his knowledge.
I think this would be fixed by the "X-Anon-Anonymize: no" (or whatever) hack. But for reasons I have outlined in the earlier round of discussions, it can't be the default. Comments?
an5877's message appears to be a trick, designed to collect anonymous/real address pairs. Johan Helsingius should take action against this trickster. Since he is learning other people's real addresses, perhaps it would be appropriate for his own real address to be revealed.
Now that would be a _very_ serious "bug" in the anon.penet.fi remailer (or, more accurately, in its administration); I am confident Johan Helsingius will reject this suggestion.
Definitely. I might block someone from using the server, but never (ok, "never say never") expose somebody.
But, this does point out that these systems which automatically assign anonymous addrsses have several security flaws. Johan has already had to introduce a "password" feature to make it more difficult to send fakemail that appears to be from a particular email address through the server, thus revealing the corresponding anonymous address when it is delivered.
I think that merely masks the real problem.
It fixes *one* problem. I really appreciate suggestions for other solutions.
These are serious problems. We need some discussion of how to avoid these simple tricks for defeating the anonymity while still having an easy-to-use system.
Any ideas? For starters, I think the default behavior of anon.penet.fi is badly broken.
There has been a lot of discussion about this, and I'm afraid it's too late to change the *default* behavior now...
But a more serious problem with anon.penet.fi and the other remailers I am aware of is the necessity that we pseudonymous clients have to rely on the integrity of their administrators to keep our pseudonyms private. In the face of social pressure, such as Xavier's, that may be asking a lot.
True. And that's why PGP-based stuff & remailer chains is the way to go for "hard" anonymity. But for posting to general newsgroups, we also need a system with working return paths. This doesn't seem possible with current remailer chain systems. Julf (admin@anon.penet.fi) P.S. In case I forgot to announce it, as you could see from the message I'm replying to, PGP stuff doesn't get stripped at anon.penet.fi anymore.....
Currently to mail to person 1234 at penet, you send mail to anon1234@penet.fi This mail goes out anonymously from the sender, either using an existing mail address or creating one. But if one were able to reach person 1234 also with the email address, say, name1234@penet.fi the behavior could be _not_ to make this posting anonymous. To wit, the 1234 indicates that you are replying to a pseudonymous recipient, and the anon/name pair indicate whether the sender is anonymous. Thus no change in default behavior, and no new header lines. Eric
Currently to mail to person 1234 at penet, you send mail to
anon1234@penet.fi
This mail goes out anonymously from the sender, either using an existing mail address or creating one. But if one were able to reach person 1234 also with the email address, say,
name1234@penet.fi
the behavior could be _not_ to make this posting anonymous.
To wit, the 1234 indicates that you are replying to a pseudonymous recipient, and the anon/name pair indicate whether the sender is anonymous. Thus no change in default behavior, and no new header lines.
A great idea, Eric! Thanks! Oh, a minor correction, it`s an1234, not anon1234. So in the name of symmetry the non-anonymous path should be na1234. Now we only have to fight about what the From: line in anonymous messages ought to say, an1234 or na1234? Julf
Re: an1234 vs. na1234 Julf writes:
Now we only have to fight about what the From: line in anonymous messages ought to say, an1234 or na1234?
You can determine the From: line by looking at the destination. If the destination is to another alias, then you use "an1234", since the reply should appear to be coming from another alias. Using the "an1234" address triggers the aliasing mechanism. On the other hand, if the destination is to a non-alias mailbox, then use the "na1234" form. In this way the alias mechanism is not invoked upon reply. For messages with more than one addressee, split all the alias destinations into one message, and all the non-alias destinations into another. Set the From: line accordingly in each message. This avoids the attack of using a two-recipient message to invoke an incorrect alias behavior. For newsgroup postings, where no particular addressee is listed, and for mailing lists, I would suggest using "na1234", but this probably is a change in the default behavior for newsgroups. You would like newsgroups and mailing lists to act the same, and that means either keeping a list of mailing list entry points (ick), or using the "na1234" form. Eric
participants (3)
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an5877@anon.penet.fi
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Eric Hughes
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Johan Helsingius