Public kiosks are OK as a simple and moderately effective technique for assuring anonymity, and they're ideal for a security-naive person who is unable to verify the security of a more complex system. But for my own use, I am much more confident in the security guarantee given by encryption on a portable computer and anonymizing using Chaum-style remailers...
Indeed. By definition, a public kiosk is in a public area, with open access to all including the Bad Guy's agents and investigators. And tracking people's physical movements in public places is an art that investigators have had many years to refine and perfect. Many more than, say, factoring large RSA public keys... Phil
I thank Marc Ringuette and Phil Karn for their comments on public kiosks. They remind me that public kiosks are not a panacea, and that we need to educate others to that awareness. Nevertheless, let us remember the econmonics of the situation. It is expensive to follow people around--more expensive, say, than an illegal tap on a home phone line. By increasing the cost of the suppression of information, one ensures that more information, in the aggregate, is released. We may not be able to provide for any particular individual's privacy, but we can take actions for which we know that we will increase the total amount of privacy (however hard that would be to strictly define). Eric
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Eric Hughes -
karn＠qualcomm.com