-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- On Tue, 1 Jun 93 09:56:45 -0700, Eric Hughes <uunet!soda.berkeley.edu!hughes> wrote -
We are trying to build a sandbox, and the government is trying to restrict the use of sand.
We are indeed doing just this. Although the small minority of us compu-professionals are writing code, flailing congressmen, etc., it takes more than what is currently being acknowledged to get things changed. I will not, however, discontinue my diatribe with my elected representatives on the topic of our electronic rights to privacy under the first and fourth amendments. (I'm having too much fun doing something that I seriously, and perhaps foolishly, believe in.) Is there something going on with the EFF that we should know about?
That said, I also urge those who are writing code to continue. To those of you not writing code, however, I say start talking to your friends and neighbors and communities and newspapers.
Now.
We are working on it. A vote of confidence towards crypto-freedom. Are we east-coast-niks welcome in this process? Is policy being drawn by a few EFF persona without consultation of the masses? Eric, before you say "Now,", you'd best detail us. I know what you mean, however, many of the crypto-warriors which may follow do not. It may be a good idea to _now_ place a broad policy statement. Cheers. -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.2 iQCVAgUBLAwNs5RLcZSdHMBNAQFlRAP7BSpktDz4URB0rhWQ5mxb2UcJqEZHdp+2 It+Whxh1MzYTLFi0SfvZRQYjPEZO1wN2ac8bQyl2zOpi7viAg8X+AfEZACWooqUQ y8Dyddup15MNj/p53fJQhzKYaX4K4xD2h6WTWO1X8Q2SPHo0WV48Hu+uO8nyeoqD PJj0d/IHvg4= =6GvE -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- Paul Ferguson | The future is now. Network Integrator | History will tell the tale; Centreville, Virginia USA | We must endure and struggle fergp@sytex.com | to shape it. Stop the Wiretap (Clipper/Capstone) Chip.
Paul, you of all people don't need to feel slighted when I urge people to do something, anything, about the wiretap chips. Therefore, let me rephrase my exhortation to the list at large. If you are doing something, continue. If you are not, start. The particulars of what one does are not so nearly important to me as that one does something. Anyone who understands at least one tenth of this list understands more than your average reporter. While I would like all the details to be perfectly accurate everywhere, this is not going to happen. Even if you don't feel like you are an expert, you are more expert than most. With the aid of the documents in the ftp site, and a few hours time, you can become even more expert.
Is there something going on with the EFF that we should know about?
The EFF is going to be involved with the cryptography issue. More than that and I defer to John Gilmore, who is on the EFF board and this list and who can speak more authoritatively than I.
I know what you mean, however, many of the crypto-warriors which may follow do not. It may be a good idea to _now_ place a broad policy statement.
Here is my own very short version of my policy toward the wiretap chips: "The government has no right to restrict my use of cryptography in any way. They may not forbid me to use whatever ciphers I may like, nor may they require me to use any that I do not like." The hypothetical backdoor in clipper is a charlatan's issue by comparison, as is discussion of how to make a key escrow system 'work.' Do not be suckered into talking about an issue that is not important. If someone want to talk about potential back doors, refuse to speculate. The existence of a front door (key escrow) make back door issues pale in comparison. If someone wants to talk about how key escrow works, refuse to elaborate. Saying that this particular key escrow system is bad has a large measure of complicity in saying that escrow systems in general are OK. Always argue that this particular key escrow system is bad because it is a key escrow system, not because it has procedural flaws. This right issue is that the government has no right to my private communications. Every other issue is the wrong issue and detracts from this central one. If we defeat one particular system without defeating all other possible such systems at the same time, we have not won at all; we have delayed the time of reckoning. Trenchantly yours, Eric
I have shied away from any "political" action against Clipper because I am unsure how a Canadian can help... I would like to think that the Canadian government will not follow the US lead, but I'm sure that its just a matter of time. I am open to suggestions... How do I avoid being told that I'm fighting "someone elses" war? --- Nick MacDonald | NMD on IRC i6t4@jupiter.sun.csd.unb.ca | PGP 2.1 Public key available via finger On Tue, 1 Jun 1993, Eric Hughes wrote:
If you are doing something, continue. If you are not, start.
I have shied away from any "political" action against Clipper because I am unsure how a Canadian can help...
Preempt government restrictions by fighting for the explicit right to strong cryptography. Point out how those foolish folks south are going to screw themselves over by government mandated cryptography. One of the arguments that is being made in this country against the wiretap chip is that it will harm overseas business. In Canada you can turn this around and show what a great economic boon you have available. You can point out that the US has abandoned their foreign markets in secure communications, which will, of course, be the only kind of communications of the future. Get Northern Telecom on your side. Eric
One of the arguments that is being made in this country against the wiretap chip is that it will harm overseas business. In Canada you can turn this around and show what a great economic boon you have available.
Another argument the U.S. government is making is that they surveyed encryption policy in various countries and "it's not beyond the pale to limit domestic encryption -- France does it, for example". If Canada takes a strong stance on domestic encryption, then it is a counter-example rather than an example of repression. The Australian example of deploying GSM in the face of law-enforcement objections has already been used in testimony to NIST (and I'm sure we'll use it to convince Congress as well). You could also argue for removing Canadian restrictions on export of cryptography. Currently the Canadian regulations are just rubber-stamps of the US regulations. This has the advantage that it's legal to export US crypto to Canada -- e.g. crypto code developed in the U.S. can be legally moved outside the range of U.S. law. This was useful for PGP; it is legal to use and possess PGP in Canada since US patent law doesn't apply. But it limits the development of an export crypto industry for Canadians, and it furthers the image of Canada as being under the U.S. government's thumb. John Gilmore
participants (4)
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Eric Hughes
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fergp@sytex.com
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gnu
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Nickey MacDonald