Mr. Wayner posts thoughtful descriptions and reflections on the CSSPAB proceedings. While I want to express my appreciation for this interesting and revealing glimpse and encourage future postings in the same vein, there are some deeply upsetting views and grating, gratuitous benedictions expressed therein that would sound worse than fingernails on a chalkboard for any hard core cypherpunk. Following is mostly vitriolic and sarcastic flame; feel free to ignore it; you've been warned. * * * Peter Wayner <pcw@access.digex.net>

The board itself runs with a quasi-legal style

quasi-legal? and the NSA was there? how apropos!

All of them came from the upper ranks of the military or legal system and a person doesn't rise to such a position without adopting the careful air of the very diligent bureaucrat.

This is precisely the fluffery and facade we are *not* impressed with. The very Cream of the NSA, the brilliant minds who brought you Clipper and DSA.

The NSA has rarely had trouble in the past exercising either its explicitly granted legal authority or its implied authority. The phrase "national security" is a powerful pass phrase around Washington and there is no reason for me to believe that the NSA wouldn't get all of the access to the escrow database that it needs [...]

but you see, that is the problem. As P. Ferguson wrote, ` `National security': the root password to the Constitution.'

Building in a backdoor would only leave a weakness for an opponent to exploit and that is something that is almost as sacrilidgeous at the NSA as just putting the classified secrets in a Fed Ex package to Saddam Hussein.

Hm, do you think they felt the same about DES? DSA? decreasing key size makes me wonder at night...

Next there was a report from Geoff Greiveldinger , the man from the Department of Justice with the responsibility of implementing the the Key Escrow plan. [...] It became clear that the system was not fully designed.

Reminds me of the trembling, pale kid at the front of the classroom giving a book report, reading aloud from a blank page. He didn't do his homework. Not only that, but it's the wrong assignment. No matter, he's about to be expelled anyway. This key escrow system is as solid as oozing phlegm. In the Official Announcement we hear of a new Key Escrow System. Hm, what's it about? Apparently not a Key Escrow System, from what I can figure out. Denning scrambles out with some bizarre circumlocution soon after the announcement that is supposedly now Null and Void, and we have this grand new system with the Magic Eavesdropping Box. How are we to be sure that this Box is secure? Why, it utilizes a Secure Chip inside. What about the Chip? Why, there are Secure Atoms and Electrons, assuredly in the Proper Places with Correct Clearance, as designated by The Grand Holiness.

At this point, I had just listened to an entirely logical presentation from a perfect gentleman. We had just run though a system that had many nice technological checks and balances in it. Subverting it seemed very difficult.

Gee, I missed something there somewhere. `Not fully designed' but `difficult to subvert' because of all the `nice technological checks'. Yes, I would bet my life on that.

The most interesting speaker was the assistant director of the National Security Agency, Dr. Clint Brooks. He immediately admitted that the entire Clipper project was quite unusual because the Agency was not used to dealing with the open world. Speaking before a wide audience was strange for him and he admitted that producing a very low cost commercial competitive chip was also a new challenge for them.

their amateurism is frightening and pathetic. The lesson is not that it is `a new challenge' but a outrageous violation of their authority. I'm quite nauseated that someone here would succumb to their transparent and shifty rhetoric. They have no legal authority whatsoever in proposing this. They still fail to grasp this simple fact, despite a bludgeoning CPSR lawsuit slaps and FOIA jabs. It is a wonder they have stopped hiding behind the legs of the President.

He readily admitted that the Clipper system isn't intended to catch any crooks.

Ah, but we have the Official Announcement from Mr. Clinton explaining how it would be used to catch `criminals, drug dealers, and terrorists'! How are we to reconcile this bizarre twist? This is all so grotesque, so Orwellian, so wretched, so horribly nightmarish... we have the Key Escrow Initiative with everything but the Key Escrow read, to catch all the Criminals who aren't Criminals.

When I listened, though, I began to worry about what is going to happen as we begin to see the eventual blurring of data and voice communications systems.

what a fantastic revelation! when did you come to this epiphany?

WHen this happens, programmable phones are going to emerge.

what a ...

This could easily be a proprietary encryption system that scrambles everything.

what a ... gosh, it would make sense for the NSA to propose Clipper for a scenario like that! what a coincidence!

The traditional way of controlling technology by controlling the capital intensive manufacturing sites will be gone.

what a ... `traditional way of controlling'? more like the `past method of manipulation'!

Sure, the NSA and the police will go to Radio Shack and say "We want your cooperation" and they'll get it. But it's the little, slippery ones that will be trouble in the new, software world.

what a ... It is the big, lumbering one called NSA that is already in *deep* trouble. [ sheriffs, district attorneys, FBI agents]

Their message was direct and they didn't hesitate to compare encryption with assault rifles. One even said, "I don't want to see the officers outgunned in a technical arena."

sorry, they don't have a choice in the matter.

One DA from New Jersey said that in his office, they process about 10,000 cases a year, but they only do one to two wiretaps on average. It just seems like a big hassle and expense for them.

oh, perhaps you are proposing it shouldn't be a `hassle' or a `expensive'. Let me tell you, infringing on rights better DAMN WELL be more than a `hassle'!

The police tried to use the low numbers of wiretaps as evidence that they're not out there abusing the system, but I kept thinking that this was mainly caused by the high cost and relatively low utility of the technique.

bless you. Now I only feel 95% like strangling you.

In the end, I reduced the calculus of the decision about Clipper to be a simple tradeoff. If we allow widespread, secure encryption, will the criminals take great advantage of this system?

who is `we'? what do you mean by `allow'? this terminology presupposes the fact that you, the NSA, or anyone else has the capability to control it.

It would empower people to protect their own information unconditionally, but at the cost of letting the criminals do the same.

ultimately a net gain, IMHO. There is far more to gain from protection of businesses and private mail than any increased evasive power given to criminals. The point is, we can catch criminals without illegitimate crutches like wiretapping. In fact, I think wiretapping ultimately encourages laziness and inefficiency in law enforcement and investigative/detective work. We stand to gain a more efficient law enforcement system when it is ultimately rendered impossible.

I began to wonder if the choice between Clipper and totally secure encryption was moot.

for any true cypherpunk, it is not. ------------------------------------------------------------------------- To find out more about the anon service, send mail to help@anon.penet.fi. Due to the double-blind, any mail replies to this message will be anonymized, and an anonymous id will be allocated automatically. You have been warned. Please report any problems, inappropriate use etc. to admin@anon.penet.fi.