Attacking networks using DHCP, DNS - probably kills DNSSEC
Somebody did an interesting attack on a cable network's customers. They cracked the cable company's DHCP server, got it to provide a "Connection-specific DNS suffic" pointing to a machine they owned, and also told it to use their DNS server. This meant that when your machine wanted to look up yahoo.com, it would look up yahoo.com.attackersdomain.com instead. This looks like it has the ability to work around DNSSEC. Somebody trying to verify that they'd correctly reached yahoo.com would instead verify that they'd correctly reached yahoo.com.attackersdomain.com, which can provide all the signatures it needs to make this convincing. So if you're depending on DNSSEC to secure your IPSEC connection, do make sure your DNS server doesn't have a suffix of echelon.nsa.gov... ------------------------------ RISKS-LIST: Risks-Forum Digest Saturday 17 June 2003 Volume 22 : Issue 78 http://catless.ncl.ac.uk/Risks/22.78.html ------------------------------ Date: Fri, 20 Jun 2003 15:33:15 -0400 From: Tom Van Vleck <thvv@multicians.org> Subject: ISP's DHCP servers infiltrated http://ask.slashdot.org/article.pl?sid=03/06/19/2325235&mode=thread&tid=126&tid=172&tid=95 "... It turns out, Charter Communications' DHCP servers were infiltrated and were providing p5115.tdko.com as the 'Connection-specific DNS suffix', causing all non-hardened Windows (whatever that means in a Windows context) machines to get lookups from a hijacked subdomain DNS server which simply responded to every query with a set of 3 addresses (66.220.17.45, 66.220.17.46, 66.220.17.47). On these IPs were some phantom services. There were proxying Web servers (presumably collecting cookies and username/password combos), as well as an ssh server where the perpetrators were most likely hoping people would simply say 'yes' to the key differences and enter in their username/password..." Hmm, my cable ISP was down this morning. Maybe coincidence. --------------------------------------------------------------------- The Cryptography Mailing List Unsubscribe by sending "unsubscribe cryptography" to majordomo@metzdowd.com
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Bill Stewart