-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Date: Tue, 1 Jun 93 21:32:24 -0700 Eric Hughes <uunet!soda.berkeley.edu!hughes> wrote -

Paul, you of all people don't need to feel slighted when I urge people to do something, anything, about the wiretap chips.

Agreed. There are many, many things that we need to do to support opposition to this ruse.

Here is my own very short version of my policy toward the wiretap chips:

"The government has no right to restrict my use of cryptography in any way. They may not forbid me to use whatever ciphers I may like, nor may they require me to use any that I do not like."

Hear, hear.

The hypothetical backdoor in clipper is a charlatan's issue by comparison, as is discussion of how to make a key escrow system 'work.' Do not be suckered into talking about an issue that is not important. If someone want to talk about potential back doors, refuse to speculate. The existence of a front door (key escrow) make back door issues pale in comparison.

If someone wants to talk about how key escrow works, refuse to elaborate. Saying that this particular key escrow system is bad has a large measure of complicity in saying that escrow systems in general are OK. Always argue that this particular key escrow system is bad because it is a key escrow system, not because it has procedural flaws.

This right issue is that the government has no right to my private communications. Every other issue is the wrong issue and detracts from this central one. If we defeat one particular system without defeating all other possible such systems at the same time, we have not won at all; we have delayed the time of reckoning.

Very lucid and wise observation. I have suggested several times that attention should also be directed to the (what I call) "potential factor" in regards to the entire "key escrow" system. The potential for abuse and unconstitutional invasions of personal privacy are ripe for the picking under this scheme. In my own public comment letter to the Computer System Security and Privacy Advisory Board, I stressed this fact and also pointed out that although the system was probably designed with good intentions (right), it will not prevent zealots and spooks from monitoring communications under certain circumstances. My other peeve is that after this "technology" has been entrenched (read: forced) on the public, I see the rug being pulled out from under the feet of any other crypto system available. That's also why I attach a great deal of importance to some form of PGP being developed where all parties (Phil Z., Jim B., and me) are happy (excluding Uncle S.). (But I suppose that's another topic...) Patriotically yours, -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.2 iQCVAgUBLAzzZJRLcZSdHMBNAQEzEwP7BVrQ4KxuFgf19Dq0avHEq8fN4+k2lVFU UBPAZYWNwzyPV3IkmrFf4RGR84H/pdWm09GmYH5wptOuKEut0M5NzO30Z9+c2SW3 7FYr5TF2rygg0mHn6SDSiZZBLuLt/XqWIwGOzJBtrTnPsrLMqZ18Xk60lH3yqUme FzTiDxDnjqA= =wnNa -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- Paul Ferguson | The future is now. Network Integrator | History will tell the tale; Centreville, Virginia USA | We must endure and struggle fergp@sytex.com | to shape it. Stop the Wiretap (Clipper/Capstone) Chip.