Curt Smith wrote:

It is strange that crypto was a lot more popular back when cryptography export was heavily controlled. Many people fought for their crypto rights, but cannot be bothered with encrypted e-mail. It is similar to securing the right to vote and then declining to do so.

Acts that are potentially slightly illegal and certainly considered naughty by some carry more appeal to many than acts that are unquestionably as above board as they are boring. Once the export regs changed and more advanced uses of cryptographic applications failed in the market place, crypto lost some of its sex appeal to its initial early-adopter rebel constituency.

Lucky indicates that strong crypto has gone "under the hood" and is now "mainstream" and "ubiquitous".

This is not true. There are countless e-mail and instant messages sent as plaintext across networks, through wireless, and over the Internet.

I believe our viewpoint coincide, rather than conflict. Crypto has gone under the hood, it is used by anybody accessing an https website, which nowadays is just about anybody with a web browser. Crypto is used by many corporate employee's accessing the corporate VPN. It is the rare Internet user, of which there are of course many more than there were Cypherpunks got started, that does not employ strong crypto in some fashion.

Also "under-the-hood" is a risky place for crypto. It may be "patched" or "upgraded" right out of your system. Or perhaps "improved" to 40-bit for optimum performance.

Agreed. Which is why I pointed out that the encryption taking place under-the-hood tends to be a reasonable defense against a passive or less-resourced attacker while being frequently unsuitable against the active, well-resourced attacker. Though I would contend that there are more of the former than there are of the latter, I too continue to utilize, as I pointed out, strong crypto that requires active user interaction permitting the trust decision to occur.

Stand alone cryptography is best. I enjoy sealing my personal letters in an envelope. I am uncomfortable entrusting that process to a third-party, or to the mailman. I am similarly uncomfortable entrusting e-mail encryption to an embedded system and cached authentication systems.

I indeed consider passive encryption methods alone to be typically insufficient for some of my personal security needs and am continuing to utilize encryption that requires me as the user to make that trust decision. But that does not mean that no security benefits are to be had from opportunistic encryption of Internet traffic. Example: the other day I sent an email to a friend that accidentally failed to PGP encrypt. The email did not contain truly critical information, but I certainly would have preferred for neither my friend's nor my ISP to have ready access to the cleartext of that email. Fortunately, we had encrypted SMTP connections end-to-end, thus protecting the contents of the email from the ISP's, albeit perhaps not from the NSA. Lastly, allow me to address the issue raised that many IM protocols in use today do not support crypto at this time. This is true, but I noticed that a good majority of the P2P efforts introduced at CODECON all included support for encryption as part of the protocol. The various developers had read Applied Cryptography, understood a sufficient part of it, and made provisions to design crypto into their protocols from the beginning rather than as an adjunct to be thought about later. While the details of the initial implementations were of varying quality, one project began by using Blowfish in ECB mode until the developer realized that he could see patterns in the ciphertext, but changing a protocol during alpha testing to use a secure mode of a block cipher given that the protocol already contains all the hooks for crypto, may be considerably easier than gluing crypto onto some of the existing IM system Given the rapid changes in the P2P space, just because some IM and P2P systems today fail to offer cryptographic protections should not be taken as an indicator that these protocol's successors will not offer transparent crypto as a default feature. One such project that I have been somewhat following is the Anonymous IRC project. While their design is far from perfect, it is one of many steps into the right direction. http://www.invisiblenet.net/ There are dozens of similar projects underway, all employing crypto, that may one day replace the prevalent IM clients as rapidly as Gnutella and later Kazaa and Morpheus replaced Napster. How does the increased use of strong crypto under-the-hood help Cypherpunks? The answer reminds me of the response another Cypherpunk gave to my posting statistics about the nature of the USENET traffic seen by a major node. I expressed surprise at these rather revealing statistics, musing that there had to be a lesson to be learned from the fact that the bulk of the data is generated in newsgroups that one would not initially consider mainstream. His response was illuminating: "Yes, the lesson is: just look at all that cover traffic". --Lucky

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noticed that a good majority of the P2P efforts introduced at CODECON all included support for encryption as part of the protocol. The various

On 26 May 2002 at 19:24, Morlock Elloi wrote:

I predict that first attempt to apply this on the gnutella/morpheus/kazaa/napster scale will lead to clampdown. Which is the reason that no one did it. We don't want osama sending orders that way.

Osama Bin Laden can already send orders by PGP, or even S/MIME -- but fortunately he did not, perhaps for lack of comprehension. No one is cracking down on PGP or S/MIME. A few assholes floated some trial balloons, and spread some stories, but the Bush administration, while selling out to everyone else, blew that one off, perhaps figuring that if Bin Laden could not understand the issue, neither would the critics. --digsig James A. Donald 6YeGpsZR+nOTh/cGwvITnSR3TdzclVpR0+pr3YYQdkG JRE12TCQDYazxvzqIJSv7a+TSPn3wVDa/nJwgkr2 41luNgdnx0+kGF4wVVQyY+SpoJcWNsLOAIpXAgeiw

On Wed, 29 May 2002, Curt Smith wrote:

I agree that under-the-hood encryption is becoming more and more prevalent, and that it generally improves security. Also, the widespread use of encryption technology helps protect cryptorights in general as important to the public good.

This is kinda the opposite of...

Both legally-binding and authentication technology should not be completely transparent. Even "EULA's" require user-intervention. Digitally signed messages should require user-intervention.

this. Having it be "transparent" where the user doesn't need to know anything about how it works does not have to destroy the effectiveness of digital signatures or crypto. When people sign a document they don't know all the ramifications because few bother to read all of any document they sign - most of it won't apply as long as you keep your part of the bargin, so why bother? The same thing should be true of digital signatures. The user shouldn't have to know a thing, other than they've made a promise they better keep or all the bad clauses really do apply, and the proof of their signature will come to haunt them. The way the digital signature works does not matter to them, and it shouldn't need to. If digital crypto, signatures or e-cash are going to get into mass appeal, then their operations will be "magic" to the majority. And it all has to work, to 1 part in 10^8th or better, without user comprehension. It may well take "user intervention" to create a signature, but they shouldn't have to know what they are doing. Patience, persistence, truth, Dr. mike

I agree that the signer does not need to understand the mathematics or underlying technology for digital signatures to be viable. However, what good is an agreement when the parties do not know what the terms of the agreement are? A signature (digital or otherwise) generally indicates that the signer not only made an agreement, but also understood the agreement. A digital signatures must involve a conscious decision by the signer to keep their part of an agreement. I maintain that this requires user intervention to verify that the signer knew that they making an agreement - a "click of understanding" or pass phrase. Curt --- Mike Rosing <eresrch@eskimo.com> wrote: ...

Having it be "transparent" where the user doesn't need to know anything about how it works does not have to destroy the effectiveness of digital signatures or crypto. When people sign a document they don't know all the ramifications because

few bother to read all of any document they sign - most of it

won't apply as long as you keep your part of the bargin, so why bother?

The same thing should be true of digital signatures. The user shouldn't have to know a thing, other than they've made a promise they better keep or all the bad clauses really do apply, and the proof of their signature will come to haunt them. The way the digital signature works does not matter to them, and it shouldn't need to.

If digital crypto, signatures or e-cash are going to get into mass appeal, then their operations will be "magic" to the majority. And it all has to work, to 1 part in 10^8th or better, without user comprehension.

It may well take "user intervention" to create a signature, but they shouldn't have to know what they are doing.

Patience, persistence, truth, Dr. mike

===== end Yahoo! - Official partner of 2002 FIFA World Cup http://fifaworldcup.yahoo.com

I ain't got that much schooling in these here matters, but it seems to me that in terms of the agreements, online agreements are pretty slacking when it comes to verifying that the end user actually read the document. Most agreements online take advantage of the fact that a user is going to skip reading the document and jump straight to the "Agree" button. If the end user insists on e-signing a document without having read it it is there perogative, but I think there should be a better system in place to insure that they either read it or that they did not read it but agree anyway. Something along the lines of timers (set to an average number of minutes it takes to read the average contract), a keyword in the document itself that forces the user to peruse the document to find the keyword, or at least force the user to type "Agree" rather than just click a button. But hey, realistically speaking, I doubt there is much enforcement going on regarding these online contracts. Do we want the Federale involved in how these contracts are designed or is the industry going to self police? CW -----Original Message----- From: owner-cypherpunks@ssz.com [mailto:owner-cypherpunks@ssz.com]On Behalf Of Curt Smith Sent: Wednesday, May 29, 2002 12:21 PM To: cypherpunks@lne.com Subject: CDR: Re: When encryption is also authentication... I agree that the signer does not need to understand the mathematics or underlying technology for digital signatures to be viable. However, what good is an agreement when the parties do not know what the terms of the agreement are? A signature (digital or otherwise) generally indicates that the signer not only made an agreement, but also understood the agreement. A digital signatures must involve a conscious decision by the signer to keep their part of an agreement. I maintain that this requires user intervention to verify that the signer knew that they making an agreement - a "click of understanding" or pass phrase. Curt --- Mike Rosing <eresrch@eskimo.com> wrote: ...

Having it be "transparent" where the user doesn't need to know anything about how it works does not have to destroy the effectiveness of digital signatures or crypto. When people sign a document they don't know all the ramifications because

few bother to read all of any document they sign - most of it

won't apply as long as you keep your part of the bargin, so why bother?

The same thing should be true of digital signatures. The user shouldn't have to know a thing, other than they've made a promise they better keep or all the bad clauses really do apply, and the proof of their signature will come to haunt them. The way the digital signature works does not matter to them, and it shouldn't need to.

If digital crypto, signatures or e-cash are going to get into mass appeal, then their operations will be "magic" to the majority. And it all has to work, to 1 part in 10^8th or better, without user comprehension.

It may well take "user intervention" to create a signature, but they shouldn't have to know what they are doing.

Patience, persistence, truth, Dr. mike

===== end Yahoo! - Official partner of 2002 FIFA World Cup http://fifaworldcup.yahoo.com

Mike Rosing wrote:

On Thu, 30 May 2002, cypherpunk_reader wrote:

...

If the end user insists on e-signing a document without having read it it is there perogative, but I think there should be a better system in place to insure that they either read it or that they did not read it but agree anyway.

I don't think so. If they are fool enough to sign a document without reading it, it's the same as using a pen to sign a contract without reading it.

...

An e-signature can have the same weight in law as an ink one, and the same rules apply. A fool and their money are soon parted.

Here's my analysis of the current situation regarding electronic signatures in the United States. The following few paragraphs are the way things are as I see them, not necessarily how they should be. An e-signature in this situation would indicate assent to a contract. One of the key points to forming a valid contract is a meeting of minds between the parties. Another is authentication that the alleged contracting party was actually the person who agreed to the contract. Meeting of minds includes knowing, understanding, and agreeing to the terms of the putative contract. With paper contracts, even lengthy ones, knowledge and understanding are assumed if certain conventions are met, such as font size and emphasis of important terms, as well as opportunity to read the contract thoroughly. And the contracting party is assumed to be able to take the contract to a lawyer if he's uncertain about any part of it. Many electronic agreements fail on one or more of these points. These contracts are often very lengthy, the equivalent of several pages of printout, and are often viewed only through a very small window, and often have small or otherwise illegible fonts. In paper, this would be similar to a five-page contract being written out on post-its, with only one visible at a time. Many of the agreements cannot be printed out, which interferes with both reading and obtaining expert advice. The situation is made even worse by the mingling of technical jargon with the legal jargon; many software-related contracts are even less intellegible than other contracts. Meeting of minds is questionable under these circumstances. Authentication is similarly problematic. Ordinary contracts are commonly agreed to in person or with signatures. Electronic contracts are commonly agreed to with one or two mouse clicks. There is nothing to indicate that the "signer" was the person he alleged to be. Some laws (see below) attempt to make this irrelevant, essentially saying that if your computer agreed, you agreed, but this is unlikely to stand up in court on basic principles. I was unable to find any US case law (court cases which went to trial and verdict, and which were written up for publication) on this subject. Bear in mind that I no longer have access to Lexis or Westlaw, but google and such can usually find relevent cases. I suspect that there are no reported cases hinging on electronic signatures. This isn't surprising, because the oldest electronic signature law is less than six years old, and that's probably not enough time for a problem to have arisen, been litigated, been appealed, and been written up. The "e-sign" law of 2000 doesn't provide much help. It states simply that a contract may not be denied solely because it was electronically signed. Furthermore, it applies only to interstate and international contracts. (Though most electronic contracts for, eg, downloaded software will be interstate or international.) It doesn't provide standards or guidance for what makes a valid electronic contract. The Uniform Electronic Transactions Act (UETA) is a model law which about half of the states have enacted. Some, maybe most, of these states have modified UETA before passing it. It's not clear how this affects contracts in which only one party is in a UETA state. UETA says that an electronic record fulfills any requirements for a written contract document and that an electronic signature fulfills any requirement for a signature on the contract, and it outlines what constitutes an electronic record and an electronic signature. Interestingly, UETA states that an "agent", meaning a program, can fulfill the requirements for a signature, even without human participation. See http://www.ladas.com/BULLETINS/2002/0202Bulletin/USElectronicSignature.html for a decent summary, and http://www.uetaonline.com/ for more detail. Summary: Recent laws have attempted to make electronic contracting binding, but they have not addressed some of the fundamental principles of contract law. These fundamental principles are often stretched or broken in electronic contracting. There is no case law on electronic contracts. I suspect that a contested electronic contract would be easily voided. OK, that's the way I think it is, currently in the US. The way I think it _should_ be is much more caveat emptor, as Dr Mike and others have said, but the legislators and judges have neglected to ask for my input. -- Steve Furlong Computer Condottiere Have GNU, Will Travel Vote Idiotarian --- it's easier than thinking

On Thu, 30 May 2002, Steve Furlong wrote:

Summary: Recent laws have attempted to make electronic contracting binding, but they have not addressed some of the fundamental principles of contract law. These fundamental principles are often stretched or broken in electronic contracting. There is no case law on electronic contracts. I suspect that a contested electronic contract would be easily voided.

Thanks, that was very enlightening. The URL is good too - they mention that "An electronic signature is defined as being: an electronic sound, symbol or process attached to or logically associated with a contract or other record and executed or adopted by a person with the intent to sign the record. " I would never have thought of making a sound as part of a signature! but for voice prints, it might be a good idea.

OK, that's the way I think it is, currently in the US. The way I think it _should_ be is much more caveat emptor, as Dr Mike and others have said, but the legislators and judges have neglected to ask for my input.

Yes, and even if we tried to give input nobody would listen to me :-) Most of the issues here are human interface, what is reasonable to expect for a valid contract. The only thing I've ever "signed" online is an order for parts via credit card, and so far it's never been a legal problem. But I see where there could be major problems if people aren't really damn careful, so I'll probably be a lot more careful than I thought I was before! Patience, persistence, truth, Dr. mike

Having it be "transparent" where the user doesn't need to know anything about how it works does not have to destroy the effectiveness of digital signatures or crypto. When people sign a document they don't know all the ramifications because few bother to read all of any document they sign - most of it won't apply as long as you keep your part of the bargin, so why bother? Partially agreed - a user doesn't have to know *how* it works, but must have to take a positive step (eg, type in a password, answer "yes" to a "are you really sure you want to do this" message, that sort of thing) for it to be binding under most e-sig legislation. However, the law of contract assumes every dotted i and crossed t is read and fully understood to the full measure of the law. Enough people get caught out

Mike Rosing <eresrch@eskimo.com> wrote: this way each year (they find the contract they signed isn't what they negotiated but (eg) binds them to a full term of service (say, two years) when they wanted a three month trial... There is a balance to be had here. it should be impossible for a random user to walk up to their powered off pc, power it on, then sign a document. It should be extremely difficult for a random user to walk up to a pc that has been left logged on (but which hasn't been used to sign documents for five minutes or so) and sign a document; it should be easy for the user to sign a large number of documents in rapid succession, without having to type in a complex password every single time. If this involves remembering the password for a specified "idle" time, or using a smartcard to auth (rather than a manual password or in addition) that the user can remove when he takes a coffee break then fine - but whatever you do must almost certainly use no other hardware than is already fitted to the machine, so a usb dongle could be ok for a home user but a credit-card style smartcard almost certainly won't be (although if anyone knows a decent floppy-adaptor for smartcards, I would love to know about it)