From: "Peter G. Neumann" <neumann@csl.sri.com> Subject: Risks of belief in identities
For those of you who might believe that national ID cards might be a good idea, check out the December 2001 *Commun.ACM* Inside Risks column by me and Lauren Weinstein, previewed on my Web site http://www.csl.sri.com/neumann/insiderisks.html
The criticisms in this essay have nothing to do with national ID cards per se. The points have nothing to do with the cards being national, with them proving ID, or with them being in the form of a card for that matter. What the essay really argues against is any attempt to prove that someone has been checked for a certain property by showing a document. Documents can be forged, biometrics are imperfect, and the employees who issue the documents can be bribed. By this argument, we should have no driver's licenses, credit cards, or paper cash for that matter. Everything stuffed into your wallet is useless. Any one of those items could be forged or could have been given to you improperly. But we find them to be useful anyway. In actuality, no one in politics is seriously pushing for a national ID card. However they are talking about having an air travel card which would allow holders to go through an expedited security check. Neumann's arguments apply just as strongly against such a card (which need not have ID printed on it at all), further proving that he is not in fact opposing a national ID card but any kind of carried credential.
It's important to be clear about what characteristics of a national ID card are objectionable. Among those may be a requirement that it be shown on demand, that it be tied to databases that track movements, etc. What is disturbing about a national ID card is not the fact that it's standardized, for instance, but an array of features that could crop up elsewhere. It is possible to imagine a scenario where a database-linked, biometric-tied system using driver's licenses is worse -- that is, more privacy-invasive -- than some forms of a "national ID card." I posted more on a SiliconValley.com roundtable recently: http://forums.siliconvalley.com/discussion/msgshow.cfm/msgboard=5968009897410465&msg=8036926450156813&page=1&idDispSub=5145094516046185 -Declan On Wed, Nov 21, 2001 at 06:33:22PM -0000, Anonymous wrote:
From: "Peter G. Neumann" <neumann@csl.sri.com> Subject: Risks of belief in identities
For those of you who might believe that national ID cards might be a good idea, check out the December 2001 *Commun.ACM* Inside Risks column by me and Lauren Weinstein, previewed on my Web site http://www.csl.sri.com/neumann/insiderisks.html
The criticisms in this essay have nothing to do with national ID cards per se. The points have nothing to do with the cards being national, with them proving ID, or with them being in the form of a card for that matter. What the essay really argues against is any attempt to prove that someone has been checked for a certain property by showing a document. Documents can be forged, biometrics are imperfect, and the employees who issue the documents can be bribed.
By this argument, we should have no driver's licenses, credit cards, or paper cash for that matter. Everything stuffed into your wallet is useless. Any one of those items could be forged or could have been given to you improperly. But we find them to be useful anyway.
In actuality, no one in politics is seriously pushing for a national ID card. However they are talking about having an air travel card which would allow holders to go through an expedited security check. Neumann's arguments apply just as strongly against such a card (which need not have ID printed on it at all), further proving that he is not in fact opposing a national ID card but any kind of carried credential.
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Declan McCullagh