Re: "If you use encryption, you help the terrorists win"
Tim May wrote... "I predict we'll soon be seeing a new thought control campaign with this theme, that "if you use encryption, you help the terrorists win."" Well, I'm dubious. Right now I'm thinking their strategy has been to pull encryption down off of the social radar, and that's worked better than any frontol assault. Also watch carefully for hole-pokers...I'd bet their's also been disinfo campaigns to get the public to think that no crypto is secure (every ask anyone if they believed there was such a thing as effectively 'unbreakable' encryption? Reglar folks always believe SOMEBODY'S got the technology to break what scheme you use, so "why bother"). Let's also remember that 'terrorists' are only terrorists when their guns are small. Once they start winning a few battles they're no longer "terrorists" (eg: Mao and that whole gang). So let's beat them to the punch: "Use strong crypto in order to keep America free from the terrorists." -TD
From: Tim May <timcmay@got.net> To: cypherpunks@lne.com Subject: "If you use encryption, you help the terrorists win" Date: Fri, 24 Oct 2003 14:52:02 -0700
I predict we'll soon be seeing a new thought control campaign with this theme, that "if you use encryption, you help the terrorists win."
Similar to the heavy advertising (paid for by Big Brother, and hence by money stolen from taxpayers) with the theme that lighting up a doobie helps Osama, that taking an Oxycontin (sorry, Rush!) is equivalent to flying a plane into the World Trade Center.
Why encryption? Why now?
Perhaps Eric B. can comment on the status of encrypted cellphones, of whichever flavor, but it occurs to me that some people in Iraq desperately need them. I refer of course to those trying to expell the American soldiers occupying their cities and, as Anne Coulter put it and as senior Army officials agree, "occupy their country, take their oil, and convert them all to Christianity."
You see, the landlines and central offices were largely wiped out in the War for Oil. So what is now going in is what makes sense for nearly all developing--or flattened--countries: cellphones. The U.S. had plans for the contracts to deploy cellphones to go to American companies, but the local puppets must have had no fear of the Americans, as they went with a better bribe: mostly Arabic cellphone providers will deploy the initial system.
And of course this is why there are a lot of subcontractors with ties to the NSA, DIA, ASA, etc. now in Iraq monitoring communications. (Partly to track down Saddam's whereabouts, as he may use a cellphone, if he's careless. Recall the tale of Pablo Escobar.)
So, what would happen if even 5% of the cellphones were encrypted with a sufficiently-strong system (Eric's 3DES would presumably be enough)?
And if not encrypted cellphones, encryption of the usual sort, over networks.
I wonder what would happen to someone found carrying copies of PGP into Iraq?
(Which is not to say copies are not already widely circulating, or readily downloadable, etc.)
It seems clear to me that the puppet state of Iraq (maybe we could dub it "The Puppet Republic of Iraq"?) will not allow significant use of encrypted cellphones, or perhaps even encryption over networks. If the daily attacks on the crusaders continue to rise, and there appears to be some kind of coordination, the intelligence agencies will be called to task on why they are not intercepting (or jamming) the coordination channels.
If the expected attacks in Saudi Arabia and other soft targets happen on schedule in the next few weeks, we might even see reintroduction of crypto ban proposals inside the U.S.
We should not assume the war for crypto is won.
--Tim May "A democracy cannot exist as a permanent form of government. It can only exist until the voters discover that they can vote themselves money from the Public Treasury. From that moment on, the majority always votes for the candidate promising the most benefits from the Public Treasury with the result that a democracy always collapses over loose fiscal policy always followed by dictatorship." --Alexander Fraser Tyler
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Tyler Durden wrote:
Tim May wrote... "I predict we'll soon be seeing a new thought control campaign with this theme, that "if you use encryption, you help the terrorists win.""
Well, I'm dubious. Right now I'm thinking their strategy has been to pull encryption down off of the social radar, and that's worked better
I agree with this... and add the following... For the last decade or so many of the "bad guys" (by whoever's definition you want) have actually been using crypto, even if the general public has not. I think that by now the TLAs have learned that this works in their favor on both counts... 1) The general public doesn't really use crypto... partly because it's "off the social radar", partly because it's just too difficult, etc., etc. As a result the TLAs can employ the kind of Orwellian mass surveilance they would like and get useful information out of it. 2) The bad guys use crypto they know to be strong enough to stop brute force attacks even by "major governments". This does two things... it makes them stick out in mass surveilance, and it makes them put all their eggs in one basket (the encrypted one). The TLAs of course have many options other than brute force attack on the crypto itself... key theft, tempest, rubber hose, everyone here knows all the methods. The TLAs may have to make a little more effort, but the payoff is more likley to be very good. Wasn't there a Mafioso who got busted and convicted based on evidence that had been PGP encrypted and where they stole the key with a keyboard dongle? I'm sure that wasn't an exception; the TLAs have adapted to the technology and found that it doesn't /really/ make things harder for them... maybe it makes it easier because the bad guys feel more secure. So I think that they've learned that they really get the best of both worlds with the status quo, and I don't see any indication that they are about to rock this particular boat. This may change if the public infrastructure starts using more crypto by default and people use better key management (smart cards?) but I don't think that's really all that likely... at least at the moment there doesn't seem to be any good momentum in that direction. :j
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 On Oct 26, 2003, at 3:57 PM, Jurgen Botz wrote:
1) The general public doesn't really use crypto... partly because it's "off the social radar", partly because it's just too difficult, etc., etc. As a result the TLAs can employ the kind of Orwellian mass surveilance they would like and get useful information out of
So I think that they've learned that they really get the best of both worlds with the status quo, and I don't see any indication that they are about to rock this particular boat. This may change if the public infrastructure starts using more crypto by default and people use better key management (smart cards?) but I don't think that's really all that likely... at least at the moment there doesn't seem to be any good momentum in that direction.
It's becoming easier for the public, though. Apple's new Mac OS X 10.3 includes S/MIME built into the mailer. No more watching their eyes glaze over as I explain to my friends that they first have to install GPG, then find a plugin for their mail program, then try to teach them to create & send people keys. I prefer the GPG model of relying on people I actually trust to certify a key belongs to who it claims to belong to than relying on a corporation, but at least this will start people thinking about securing their mail. jpb - -- Joe Block <jpb@ApesSeekingKnowledge.net> The fetters imposed on liberty at home have ever been forged out of the weapons provided for defense against real, pretended, or imaginary dangers from abroad. - James Madison -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v1.2.3 (Darwin) iD8DBQE/nWbHyEXo8W2M9hsRAqiIAKCps/2yD6rC9FtXGIwQDow3MBfiHACeJVkg bowdifaZFFGnewTC++i1eow= =01Zu -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
participants (3)
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Joe Block
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Jurgen Botz
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Tyler Durden