Re: Traceable Infrastructure is as vulnerable as traceable messages.
On Fri, 3 Aug 2001, Tim May wrote:
and wait for the next time something happens if you're on DHCP, or they may have to get the cooperation of one or more other governments if your login trail runs outside their jurisdiction -- but ultimately, it's traceable.
You apparently don't even understand how even simple remailer chains work.
Hello, earth to Tim. (1) You can send anonymous mail by sending it through a remailer, but (2) The remailers themselves are not anonymous. (3) If the remailers *were* anonymous, they could not operate because then the users would not know where to send their mails.
As long as the remailers themselves are traceable, make no mistake: they exist only because the lions have not yet passed a law against them.
This may yet be attempted but even so success is not a given.
You cannot have encryption technologies advancing and leaving the law behind, so long as any vital part of the infrastructure you need is traceable and pulpable by the law.
Bear
I think you mean "palpable." I don't think pulpable is good usage but if by that you mean able to be made into pulp well, OK, it's funny. I haven't read the mixmaster source but it seems to me that end-to-end encryption protects the contents. The traffic analysis part seems vulnerable on two basic fronts : subversion of a node and overall low traffic levels. Nested encryption protects a subverted node from being able to trace the entire chain in one fell swoop. As long as there is one uncompromised node in a chain subversion doesn't guarantee a matchup of "from" and "to" but it improves the odds. With low traffic levels through a chain the statistics of traffic analysis are also improved. I like the idea of making a remailer part of a worm but it might be just as well to make it an inherent part of a product since people will attempt to eradicate a worm. Just imagine if Napster were still going full steam with a built-in remailer - huge node count and shitloads of traffic. Mike
On Fri, 3 Aug 2001 mmotyka@lsil.com wrote:
I like the idea of making a remailer part of a worm but it might be just as well to make it an inherent part of a product since people will attempt to eradicate a worm.
And succeed. How many copies of "melissa" have you seen lately? Coding a remailer, *and* coding a worm, for just one week's worth of play before they stomp it, is not worthwhile. Bear
Ray Dillinger wrote:
On Fri, 3 Aug 2001 mmotyka@lsil.com wrote:
I like the idea of making a remailer part of a worm but it might be just as well to make it an inherent part of a product since people will attempt to eradicate a worm.
And succeed. How many copies of "melissa" have you seen lately?
Coding a remailer, *and* coding a worm, for just one week's worth of play before they stomp it, is not worthwhile.
Bear
I think the "well behaved worm" prescribed by Tim might live longer since I read that as unobtrusive and generally benign but for some tolerable amount of bandwidth. Still, it would fall short of the effect you'd get if it were in a product that every teenager on the planet wanted to run.
At 3:29 PM -0700 8/3/01, mmotyka@lsil.com wrote:
Ray Dillinger wrote:
On Fri, 3 Aug 2001 mmotyka@lsil.com wrote:
I like the idea of making a remailer part of a worm but it might be just as well to make it an inherent part of a product since people will attempt to eradicate a worm.
And succeed. How many copies of "melissa" have you seen lately?
Coding a remailer, *and* coding a worm, for just one week's worth of play before they stomp it, is not worthwhile.
Bear
I think the "well behaved worm" prescribed by Tim might live longer since I read that as unobtrusive and generally benign but for some tolerable amount of bandwidth. Still, it would fall short of the effect you'd get if it were in a product that every teenager on the planet wanted to run.
I wasn't the one to suggest a worm in this recent debate. Someone else did. I included worms in the general list of ways remailers and mixes may be more ubiquitously spread: wireless, piggbacked on corporate networks, throwaway boxes, etc. (I'm steering clear of the weirder approaches: boxes hidden on the roofs of corporations and communicating with 802.11b, cards added to multiprocessor racks, etc. One weird approach that I discussed many years ago for a data haven approach some friends of mine were trying to get rolling, pre-Cypherpunks, is now much more feasible: imagine a simple Apple Airport (802.11 and variants) set up in San Diego, near the border with Tijuana. In fact, the cities run together, separated by a fence. An Airport- or Wavelan-equipped computer in San Diego is on the same local area network as one in an apartment building a few hundred feet away in TJ. Bounce packets back and forth, confusing jurisdictional issues with each hop EVEN IF LOGS are kept and court orders are issued. Of course, can do the same thing at the Canadian border, at other borders. I don't advocate that wireless methods be the backbone, as ordinary bouncing of packets around the world to many jurisdictions already does this, but it sure does make the point graphically about how hard it is to control the flow of bits.) Other wireless technologies include Bluetooth, packet radio, cellphone dial-ups, FRS radio, Ricochet (now defunct, alas), and of course various satellite links. (Most of these wireless links look a lot like ordinary machine to machine links...but the wireless transmission adds a bit to understanding how a "broadcast" mechanism doesn't have to know who is receiving. An important issue for alleged traceability issues.) By the way, broadcast mechanisms are much more than just physical RF or photon broadcasts. Usenet is a broadcast system. I called this the "Democracy Wall" approach in my 1990 presentation at the Hackers Conference. All of these things are easy to imagine (see my 1988 Crypto Anarchist Manifesto, for example) once the fundamental operation of remailer networks is grokked. --Tim May -- Timothy C. May tcmay@got.net Corralitos, California Political: Co-founder Cypherpunks/crypto anarchy/Cyphernomicon Technical: physics/soft errors/Smalltalk/Squeak/agents/games/Go Personal: b.1951/UCSB/Intel '74-'86/retired/investor/motorcycles/guns
On Fri, 3 Aug 2001 mmotyka@lsil.com wrote:
Nested encryption protects a subverted node from being able to trace the entire chain in one fell swoop.
Take your focus off the individual message. Okay? Now look at the system, the infrastructure, that you need to send that message anonymously. It relies on identifiable remops existing at known addresses. Known to the people sending messages == known to the cops. If the law wants to take this thing down, they will not be attacking the strongest point -- ie, trying to trace individual messages. Instead, they will attack the weakest point -- trying to drive remailer operators out of business and thus destroy the infrastructure you need. That is the threat model I'm concerned about, and given that network monitoring is now automatable and cheap, it is entirely do-able.
As long as there is one uncompromised node in a chain subversion doesn't guarantee a matchup of "from" and "to" but it improves the odds.
So what? A move by the g8 to protect the "global infrastructure" of the Internet, (polspeak for protecting their ability to control what the sheep think) followed by laws passed in individual countries, would force remops to operate solely in "rogue states", and messages to and from them could be screened out pretty simply. Bear
At 5:48 PM -0700 8/3/01, Ray Dillinger wrote:
If the law wants to take this thing down, they will not be attacking the strongest point -- ie, trying to trace individual messages.
Instead, they will attack the weakest point -- trying to drive remailer operators out of business and thus destroy the infrastructure you need. That is the threat model I'm concerned about, and given that network monitoring is now automatable and cheap, it is entirely do-able.
The "cops" won't be driving remailer operators in various U.S. states "out of business." Even in these sad times where democrat expediency seems to be winning out over constitutional rights, this battle will have to be fought in the courts, probably all the way to the Supreme Court. And we know that virtually no readings of the First Amendment give local courts the say over what people can mail to each other, outside of certain types of porn and suchlike. This has been discussed many times here. Do you have some new insights, or are you just now discovering the notion that government may try to apply pressure on what people mail to each other?
As long as there is one uncompromised node in a chain subversion doesn't guarantee a matchup of "from" and "to" but it improves the odds.
So what? A move by the g8 to protect the "global infrastructure" of the Internet, (polspeak for protecting their ability to control what the sheep think) followed by laws passed in individual countries, would force remops to operate solely in "rogue states", and messages to and from them could be screened out pretty simply.
Handwaving. The First Amendment will not likely be abandoned because some Marxists in France concluded that there should be limitations on what people mail to other people. --Tim May -- Timothy C. May tcmay@got.net Corralitos, California Political: Co-founder Cypherpunks/crypto anarchy/Cyphernomicon Technical: physics/soft errors/Smalltalk/Squeak/agents/games/Go Personal: b.1951/UCSB/Intel '74-'86/retired/investor/motorcycles/guns
On Fri, 3 Aug 2001, Ray Dillinger wrote:
Now look at the system, the infrastructure, that you need to send that message anonymously. It relies on identifiable remops existing at known addresses. Known to the people sending messages == known to the cops.
Not necessarily. Consider 'small world' networks. The only people who know (necessarily) of a given remailer are the operator and his users. They share a set of keys so traffic can be source encrypted. The remailer operator shares a seperate set of infrastructure keys with some of the remailer operators that they know (as distinct from the users of that same remailer/operator). Consider that sender/receiver know each other and can use yet a third encryption layer that is independent from the other two (ie the target address does not have to be known to the initial remailer operator though it will be in the header going to the first remailer. None of the intermediate remailers need to ever decrypt that far until the TTL reaches zero/one (depending on design taste). Now couple this with Plan 9's ability to completely distribute both process and file space and 'where' a remailer might be, or even 'who' is running it become a rather sticky point since it doesn't necessarily run on the 'operators' hardware.
If the law wants to take this thing down, they will not be attacking the strongest point -- ie, trying to trace individual messages.
But the only place they can trace messages in a 'small world' model is at source/destination link, which means they're already on top of you. If they're out fishing all they'd see is a bunch of packets sent between remailers with the body encrypted several layers deep with keys held by a variety of people. The beauty of the 'small world' model is it does away with the 'trust transivity' issue completely. All the intermediate remailers can do is drop a packet. Which will get recognized pretty quickly because of the inherent secondary (ie personal interaction) network that sits behind the remailer network itself.
Instead, they will attack the weakest point -- trying to drive remailer operators out of business and thus destroy the infrastructure you need.
With Plan 9 that would require them to outlaw using a particular OS. Maybe in a lot of places, but not in the US.
That is the threat model I'm concerned about, and given that network monitoring is now automatable and cheap, it is entirely do-able.
If you stick with current paradigms. -- ____________________________________________________________________ Nature and Nature's laws lay hid in night: God said, "Let Tesla be", and all was light. B.A. Behrend The Armadillo Group ,::////;::-. James Choate Austin, Tx /:'///// ``::>/|/ ravage@ssz.com www.ssz.com .', |||| `/( e\ 512-451-7087 -====~~mm-'`-```-mm --'- --------------------------------------------------------------------
On Fri, 3 Aug 2001, Jim Choate wrote:
But the only place they can trace messages in a 'small world' model is at source/destination link, which means they're already on top of you. If they're out fishing all they'd see is a bunch of packets sent between remailers with the body encrypted several layers deep with keys held by a variety of people.
the point is, that's enough. Both endpoints on such a packet's route are participants, obviously. If they want to shut it down, and they have seen such a packet, they have two people they can shut down. Repeat ad nauseam, and the infrastructure is destroyed. They don't have to trace individual messages if they can make the software illegal. And in an agent provocateur mode, the software is illegal the minute they want it to be -- all they have to do is show a DMCA violation (which they can manufacture at will) and declare the software illegal as a "circumvention device".
With Plan 9 that would require them to outlaw using a particular OS. Maybe in a lot of places, but not in the US.
Really? I guarantee you that if a particular OS gets in the way of those with power, they can declare it a "circumvention device" the same as any other software.
That is the threat model I'm concerned about, and given that network monitoring is now automatable and cheap, it is entirely do-able.
If you stick with current paradigms.
Bingo. That is absolutely the point. The current paradigm being the Internet as we know it. Bear
On Fri, 3 Aug 2001, Ray Dillinger wrote:
On Fri, 3 Aug 2001, Jim Choate wrote:
But the only place they can trace messages in a 'small world' model is at source/destination link, which means they're already on top of you. If they're out fishing all they'd see is a bunch of packets sent between remailers with the body encrypted several layers deep with keys held by a variety of people.
the point is, that's enough.
No, it's not.
Both endpoints on such a packet's route are participants, obviously.
Given. So are all the remailers in between.
If they want to shut it down, and they have seen such a packet, they have two people they can shut down.
No they don't. They have at most the sender or the receiver (never both unless they've already cracked both of them in which case this entire exercise is moot). How do you shut a program down that is running independently in a distributed process space? A process space that is distributed in such a way that the hardware that executes a particular image of the remailer for one message is NOT the same hardware that would be used for the next message. In fact neither the owner of the process or the owner of the individual boxes necessarily have a say in the selection process. The only way to take that down is take 'em all down at once. Not possible. Can the US government shut the entire Internet down? No. Can they shut down just the US based infra-structure in toto? No.
Repeat ad nauseam, and the infrastructure is destroyed.
Not hardly. You really, really should read more 9P documentation. http://plan9.bell-labs.com
They don't have to trace individual messages if they can make the software illegal.
Fortunately encryption software enjoys enough of a 1st amendment shield that isn't going to happen. A moot point.
And in an agent provocateur mode, the software is illegal the minute they want it to be -- all they have to do is show a DMCA violation (which they can manufacture at will) and declare the software illegal as a "circumvention device".
Not hardly. Sending an encrypted message to a friend across the country is not a 'circumvention device' because we aren't doing anything related to copyrighted material. An anonymous remailer is not a 'circumvention device' within the context of DMCA. Hell, if they could manufacture it at will they already would have.
With Plan 9 that would require them to outlaw using a particular OS. Maybe in a lot of places, but not in the US.
Really? I guarantee you that if a particular OS gets in the way of those with power, they can declare it a "circumvention device" the same as any other software.
Not hardly. But I'll gladly look at a more fleshed out scenario when you provide it...
Bingo. That is absolutely the point. The current paradigm being the Internet as we know it.
Which Plan 9 and 'small world' networks ain't. -- ____________________________________________________________________ Nature and Nature's laws lay hid in night: God said, "Let Tesla be", and all was light. B.A. Behrend The Armadillo Group ,::////;::-. James Choate Austin, Tx /:'///// ``::>/|/ ravage@ssz.com www.ssz.com .', |||| `/( e\ 512-451-7087 -====~~mm-'`-```-mm --'- --------------------------------------------------------------------
On Fri, Aug 03, 2001 at 08:59:41PM -0700, Ray Dillinger wrote:
And in an agent provocateur mode, the software is illegal the minute they want it to be -- all they have to do is show a DMCA violation (which they can manufacture at will) and declare the software illegal as a "circumvention device".
Um, no. The DMCA is not that broad. (If it were, it could outlaw debuggers and disassemblers.) -Declan
-- On 3 Aug 2001, at 20:59, Ray Dillinger wrote:
the point is, that's enough. Both endpoints on such a packet's route are participants, obviously. If they want to shut it down, and they have seen such a packet, they have two people they can shut down. Repeat ad nauseam, and the infrastructure is destroyed.
This assumes a unity and cohesion that lawless states are rarely capable of. If a government is so oppressive that it is doing that, government officials will have probably already stolen the wires for the copper, and will not have the technology to figure out what is going on over the ether. As I posted a few posts earlier, our threat model should be a state like 1990s Russia, not a state like 1950s Russia. --digsig James A. Donald 6YeGpsZR+nOTh/cGwvITnSR3TdzclVpR0+pr3YYQdkG iuvEcTXaEjdxhvNDFW6tl/mYM/vsSrIMHqt9YOd4 41rOOe3fLMOd3B0WSk396teZ/1WIy1JSb0P+nrmq5
On Saturday, August 4, 2001, at 12:32 PM, jamesd@echeque.com wrote:
-- On 3 Aug 2001, at 20:59, Ray Dillinger wrote:
the point is, that's enough. Both endpoints on such a packet's route are participants, obviously. If they want to shut it down, and they have seen such a packet, they have two people they can shut down. Repeat ad nauseam, and the infrastructure is destroyed.
This assumes a unity and cohesion that lawless states are rarely capable of. If a government is so oppressive that it is doing that, government officials will have probably already stolen the wires for the copper, and will not have the technology to figure out what is going on over the ether.
Entrance and exit mixes can easily be set to be Usenet or other Net-based public posting and reading places. Kind of hard for the U.S.G. or the F.S.U. to shut down a newsgroup replicated across the world in many places. Also, "repeat ad nauseum" still carries costs. Even the lawyers in Washington can't easily shut down publishers like "The Progressive" or "The New York Times." It costs a lot of money to shut down a publisher. I see no particular reason why it will suddenly become cheap ("repeat ad nauseum") for lawyers to shut down tens of thousands of Web sites, publishers, mailing lists, message pools, and Democracy Walls. Especially, by the way, if those entry and exit sites are in other countries. --Tim May
On Fri, 3 Aug 2001, Tim May wrote:
So what? A move by the g8 to protect the "global infrastructure" of the Internet, (polspeak for protecting their ability to control what the sheep think) followed by laws passed in individual countries, would force remops to operate solely in "rogue states", and messages to and from them could be screened out pretty simply.
Handwaving. The First Amendment will not likely be abandoned because some Marxists in France concluded that there should be limitations on what people mail to other people.
"Conforming to international treaties" *is* the hip way to circumvent the constitution. The latest copyright term extension gives a fine example -- conformance being used as a reason to walk over the concept of copyrights as being granted for "limited times". All you need to gut an amendment is widespread hysteria/stupidity. Drug enforcement works on the former, 1A exceptions for commercial and sexual speech the latter. Or just interpret existing law creatively, e.g. bring spoliation charges against remailer operators. If people are worked up enough, nobody will object to bringing those nasty Osama collaborators to the ground. Sampo Syreeni, aka decoy, mailto:decoy@iki.fi, gsm: +358-50-5756111 student/math+cs/helsinki university, http://www.iki.fi/~decoy/front
On Sat, 4 Aug 2001, Tim May wrote:
Entrance and exit mixes can easily be set to be Usenet or other Net-based public posting and reading places. Kind of hard for the U.S.G. or the F.S.U. to shut down a newsgroup replicated across the world in many places.
Yes, broadcasts and mixnets have different tolerance to different kinds of attacks, with benefits of synergy. But saying they're unassailable simply because they work fine, now, is short-sighted. AFAICS, it's likely a matter of priorities -- currently anonymity does not pose a significant threat to governments. If that changes, the heat will intensify, possibly to a point where means currently unimaginable could be employed (e.g. national firewalls, regulation of nonconduct, creative interpretation of laws on criminal collaboration, RICO, whathaveyou). Besides, what happens in the US currently has a lot of weight in the global Internet. Causing a netsplit between the US and the rest of the world is enough to severely harm most online services out there. Criminalization of online conduct in the US may be all it takes to make an anonymous online economy too cumbersome to hack.
I see no particular reason why it will suddenly become cheap ("repeat ad nauseum") for lawyers to shut down tens of thousands of Web sites, publishers, mailing lists, message pools, and Democracy Walls.
For remailers, mandatory filtering at the ISP level? For broadcasts, you track all the receivers and correlate to arrive at likely suspects.
Especially, by the way, if those entry and exit sites are in other countries.
If they can pass CALEA, they probably could force internet exchanges to filter remailer traffic, given favorable public opinion. All you need is a view of anonymity proponents as anti-state anarchists intent on protecting known dangerous criminals (thus, collaboration), and a couple of high profile trials where remailers successfully protect the identity of terrorists or child molesters. The fuss about Osama bin Laden and encryption/stego might well be the first step in such a campaign. As for foreign remailers, a number of governments might be pliable enough to overlook US originated DoS attacks on them after having been convinced that anonymity is a real threat not only to the US, but to each and every nation state. Now, the above is of course fiction, for now at least. But keeping such widescale attacks on the infrastructure part of the threat model is not, IMHO, a bad idea. The discussions on stego, disposable remailers, physical broadcast technology and the like are part of that, and serve to lay the groundwork in case shit one day does hit the fan. Sampo Syreeni, aka decoy, mailto:decoy@iki.fi, gsm: +358-50-5756111 student/math+cs/helsinki university, http://www.iki.fi/~decoy/front
I'm quite aware of the attack. It's not guaranteed successful yet. If you've paid attention to our lawyers recently it sounds like the battle is sporadic and the outcome mixed. Until the heavy hand wipes out remailers the fate of an individual message is interesting. So as of even date being able to assign IP addresses to persons and remailer nodes is not equivalent to compromising the communications. It's the best solution available today isn't it? Ray Dillinger wrote:
On Fri, 3 Aug 2001 mmotyka@lsil.com wrote:
Nested encryption protects a subverted node from being able to trace the entire chain in one fell swoop.
Take your focus off the individual message.
Okay?
Now look at the system, the infrastructure, that you need to send that message anonymously. It relies on identifiable remops existing at known addresses. Known to the people sending messages == known to the cops.
If the law wants to take this thing down, they will not be attacking the strongest point -- ie, trying to trace individual messages.
Instead, they will attack the weakest point -- trying to drive remailer operators out of business and thus destroy the infrastructure you need. That is the threat model I'm concerned about, and given that network monitoring is now automatable and cheap, it is entirely do-able.
As long as there is one uncompromised node in a chain subversion doesn't guarantee a matchup of "from" and "to" but it improves the odds.
So what? A move by the g8 to protect the "global infrastructure" of the Internet, (polspeak for protecting their ability to control what the sheep think) followed by laws passed in individual countries, would force remops to operate solely in "rogue states", and messages to and from them could be screened out pretty simply.
Bear
On Monday, August 6, 2001, at 09:41 AM, mmotyka@lsil.com wrote:
I'm quite aware of the attack. It's not guaranteed successful yet. If you've paid attention to our lawyers recently it sounds like the battle is sporadic and the outcome mixed.
Until the heavy hand wipes out remailers the fate of an individual message is interesting. So as of even date being able to assign IP addresses to persons and remailer nodes is not equivalent to compromising the communications.
It's the best solution available today isn't it?
Ray Dillinger wrote:
(post by Ray elided)
I encourage people not to "top-post" (placing comments at the top of an included message). It's becoming endemic on Usenet. Not a slam against Mike, just trying to remind people of how bad top-posting can be. --Tim May
On Mon, 6 Aug 2001 mmotyka@lsil.com wrote: <re: driving remops out of business>
I'm quite aware of the attack. It's not guaranteed successful yet.
True. But it beats the snot out of guessing keys. Offhand, I'd estimate that if three US remops were taken down forcefully, and the federal law looked as though any other could be, all but two or three hardcases would cease operating remailers in the USA. That would wipe out well over 70% of the remailers, leaving a very small universe indeed to monitor. Bear
On 6 Aug 2001, at 10:13, Ray Dillinger wrote:
Offhand, I'd estimate that if three US remops were taken down forcefully, and the federal law looked as though any other could be, all but two or three hardcases would cease operating remailers in the USA.
Depends on exactly what you mean by "taken down forcefully". If you just mean forced to cease operations without additional repercussions, I think it's more likely that more would pop up.
That would wipe out well over 70% of the remailers, leaving a very small universe indeed to monitor.
Bear
Just speculation, or course, but I suspect there are quite a few people out there who would be willing and able to run remailers but don't bother doing it because there's no perceived need and no real payoff. I believe in principle a mixmaster network really only needs two remailers to exist to function properly. George
On Monday, August 6, 2001, at 02:01 PM, georgemw@speakeasy.net wrote:
Just speculation, or course, but I suspect there are quite a few people out there who would be willing and able to run remailers but don't bother doing it because there's no perceived need and no real payoff.
I believe in principle a mixmaster network really only needs two remailers to exist to function properly.
No, because then the collusion set is reduced to only two. If Alice and Bob run the only two mixes, a trivial matter for them to collude. Even with three mixes, which many think to be the canonical Dining Cryptographers net size (perhaps because the menu example is given with three diners?), collusion is trivial. In the DC-Net paper of '88, only the first two pages is devoted to outlining how mix-nets basically work: the rest of the paper dealt with dealing with collusion amongst subsets of the participants. A mix-net of two mixes is not even worth discussing. --Tim May
On Mon, 6 Aug 2001, Ray Dillinger wrote:
in the USA. That would wipe out well over 70% of the remailers, leaving a very small universe indeed to monitor.
In case this happens I'll be happy to run one on a DSL line. I'm sure many others will suddenly see the light, too. It would also motivate people to write worms with remailer functionality instead of the usual stupid DoS cargo. -- Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://www.lrz.de/~ui22204/">leitl</a> ______________________________________________________________ ICBMTO : N48 10'07'' E011 33'53'' http://www.lrz.de/~ui22204 57F9CFD3: ED90 0433 EB74 E4A9 537F CFF5 86E7 629B 57F9 CFD3
-- On 6 Aug 2001, at 10:13, Ray Dillinger wrote:
Offhand, I'd estimate that if three US remops were taken down forcefully, and the federal law looked as though any other could be, all but two or three hardcases would cease operating remailers in the USA. That would wipe out well over 70% of the remailers, leaving a very small universe indeed to monitor.
If the government decides to crack down on any one activity, and harm any particular small group of people, it is likely to have a large effect on that activity, and cause considerable harm to those people. If, however, the government decides to crack down on lots of activities, and harm lots of people, it is unlikely to succeed. Right now the government is cracking down on lots and lots of activities, and lashing out at lots and lots of people, with predictable results. To be effectual against remailers, the government would have to give them priority over lots of other people that the government wants to harm. There is a big big queue of people to be whacked who are not being whacked, and only finite resources to whack them. If the government moves remailers nearer to the top of its priorities, someone else gets moved back away from the top. --digsig James A. Donald 6YeGpsZR+nOTh/cGwvITnSR3TdzclVpR0+pr3YYQdkG MATT5Iy6h/FaowiQwNJm0qWfplP7ymQoeXaSY9kS 4w7niDzXVgD680AVmm/BlEoMXN+0I7nHUwRXzKrrV
participants (10)
-
Declan McCullagh -
Eugene Leitl -
georgemw＠speakeasy.net -
jamesd＠echeque.com -
Jim Choate -
Jim Choate -
mmotyka＠lsil.com -
Ray Dillinger -
Sampo Syreeni -
Tim May