Re: e voting (receipts, votebuying, brinworld)
On Tuesday 25 November 2003 01:21 pm, Trei, Peter wrote: [snip]
All I want is a system which is not more easily screwed around with then paper ballots. Have some imagination - you could, for example, set things up so the voter, and only the voter, can see the screen and/or paper receipt while voting, but still make it impossible to use a camera without being detected.
Peter
I was thinking of those boxes with viewing ports that you look into to get your eyes tested when you renew your drivers license. You could have those out in the open, that way you'd have the privacy (only turn the display on if the viewing port is completely covered), but if you tried to use a camera it would be pretty obvious (or you could design the lens of the port to make it impossible to discern the ballot except with the human eye(s)). Here in the sticks we just use the ole' number two pencil to fill in the oval. Some fancy polling places run the ballot through a reader to verify that there aren't any problems (missing ovals, multiple votes, etc.). They'll let you have three tries at it. However, there doesn't seem to be anything to stop me from going back in a few hours later and claiming to be someone else at a different address other than the if the person has already voted or by relying on steel-trap memory of the volunteer elderly ladies than man the poll (of course in our small town that can be pretty effective) :) . -Neil -- Neil Johnson http://www.njohnsn.com PGP key available on request.
All I want is a system which is not more easily screwed around with then paper ballots.
I think it's called OCR. Paper ballots, marked by the voter, not by software, then counted by software: - the ballot and the audit document are one and the same - no opportunity for software to mess with the printed record - option for a quick and dirty recount by feeding the ballots through a different counting machine (maybe with different software, from a different vendor) - further option for a manual recount of the original ballots (which are probably more legible than any machine-printed receipts) Oh, and by the way, these are the only kind of electronic voting machines approved, so far, in Mass. Miles Fidelman ************************************************************************** The Center for Civic Networking PO Box 600618 Miles R. Fidelman, President & Newtonville, MA 02460-0006 Director, Municipal Telecommunications Strategies Program 617-558-3698 fax: 617-630-8946 mfidelman@civicnet.org http://civic.net/ccn.html Information Infrastructure: Public Spaces for the 21st Century Let's Start With: Internet Wall-Plugs Everywhere Say It Often, Say It Loud: "I Want My Internet!" **************************************************************************
- option for a quick and dirty recount by feeding the ballots through a different counting machine (maybe with different software, from a different vendor) or indeed constructing said machines so they *assume* they will be feeding another machine in a chain (so every party could have their own counter in
Miles Fidelman wrote: the chain if they wish to, and each gets a bite at the cherry in sequence)
On Wed, 26 Nov 2003, Dave Howe wrote:
- option for a quick and dirty recount by feeding the ballots through a different counting machine (maybe with different software, from a different vendor) or indeed constructing said machines so they *assume* they will be feeding another machine in a chain (so every party could have their own counter in
Miles Fidelman wrote: the chain if they wish to, and each gets a bite at the cherry in sequence)
GREAT idea! Sort of like the Space Shuttle computers - 5 operating in parallel, one from a completely different hardware and software vendor.
participants (3)
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Dave Howe
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Miles Fidelman
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Neil Johnson