On Fri, Dec 21, 2012 at 09:03:02AM -0800, brianc@smallworldnews.tv wrote 5.5K bytes in 0 lines about: : So I guess I'd say, who is going to fund a competitor to skype built on : jitsi? Without a. Convenient easy to use GUI b. Sexy advocates and adopters : and c. A marketing plan you aren't going to compete with Skype, Google : Hangout, etc. My guess would be the people behind jitsi, http://bluejimp.com/ and their partners, https://jitsi.org/index.php/Main/Partners ippi.fr worked pretty well, until they demanded a copy of my passport to continue service. : If security and privacy experts and developers are serious about broad : adoption of their tools and not just building a closed club of : cryptoexperts shouting "fire!" We have to work this out. I'm pretty busy Conversely, as I continue to work with global law enforcement, a shocking amount of crime still happens over the public telephone network. Even with its lack of encryption, centralized data collection, and lawful intercept, criminal organizations are still successfully coordinating, planning, and growing over this 100+ year old technology and networks. And for all of the fancy tools, analysis, and skills, law enforcement is still one step behind the criminals simply using the public phone networks. It's the 1% of criminals which use things like skype, tor, cryptocat, i2p, google hangouts, etc. And even then, they screw up and get caught because their ego grows larger than their skills. And to take a super-unpopular stance, empirical evidence says use of skype isn't the problem. Take Syria as an example, the problem is OSX and Windows on the laptops because that's what the Syrian state malware attacks. From a resource perspective, the Assad regime is being economically smart. Rather than trying to attack some cryptosystem and glean data from traffic analysis, just attack the end user and get all the data before it enters the cryptosystem. This is likely the same analysis the German's used. Rather than trying to crack skype, they got state-sponsored malware to crack the operating system and get the data before it enters skype. Vietnam approached the skype-problem by using parabolic microphones outside the houses of suspected activists. Solving the analog problem (voice, keystroke sound analysis, electrical grid background noise, etc) and user security weaknesses ("Oh look, an attachment! Let's load it up!") is probably a better place for solutions than yet another crypto-system. -- Andrew http://tpo.is/contact pgp 0x6B4D6475 -- Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password at: https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.ativel.com http://postbiota.org 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE