Remailer operators should have permanent encrypted links to one another, with constant (or at least message-uncorrelated) traffic volumes. They can still use latency, message pools, and other features, of course. But when it comes time to deliver messages to the next remailer in the list, that should be done with a reliable and direct connection that doesn't have to depend on the vagaries of sendmail, procmail, Microsoft servers or the many other layers that get in the way. This would both increase the reliability of the remailer network and improve its security by hiding inter-remailer traffic.
Great idea! Cypherpunks write code. Let us know when you have something we can look at.
On Sat, 15 Dec 2001, An Metet wrote:
Remailer operators should have permanent encrypted links to one another, with constant (or at least message-uncorrelated) traffic volumes. They can still use latency, message pools, and other features, of course. But when it comes time to deliver messages to the next remailer in the list, that should be done with a reliable and direct connection that doesn't have to depend on the vagaries of sendmail, procmail, Microsoft servers or the many other layers that get in the way. This would both increase the reliability of the remailer network and improve its security by hiding inter-remailer traffic.
Great idea! Cypherpunks write code. Let us know when you have something we can look at.
Plan 9 OS: http://plan9.bell-labs.com Hangar 18 Distributed Computing Co-Op: http://einstein.ssz.com/hangar18 A Plan 9 based tool we hope to have available this summer; igor A remailer for Plan 9 One of the primary values of the Internet is email. It provides a reliable and consistent link across time and space. It is the proto-typical killer app. However, to use email effectively there should be two additional features. We don't promise more don't exist. The first feature is the ability to reflect or remail a single email to many recipients. The second is to strip identifying header information from the sender prior to the subscriber getting it. igor does not use 'embedded routing commands' like many other anonymous remailer packages. We believe that tampering or altering the body of the email is simply wrong. We offer two way to input data into igor. The first is through Subject: line escaped commands and the second is through additional header files. An example of each is, Subject: Some title or other [igor: some_commands, must_come_last] or, X-igor: some_commands This allows the first remailer to strip the command data out and then process the email as if igor had never been involved. igor supports limited routing selection, which is intended to make traffic analysis harder. igor sends individual emails embedded in igor-specific header info to eliminate as much interaction with the email itself. All inter-igor traffic is encrypted with PK's managed by the Evil Geniuses. Route Commands (ie igor: * * ...): strip Strip the From: header zombie Strip the From: header and replace with From: Walking Dead route# Route the message through # other igor nodes, not selectable by the user, where # is from 1 to 3. route0 is assumed and means send to recipient directly cover Provide cover traffic for each outbound email by sending all know igors a single bogus email. This provides n-copy cover traffic. subscribe $ Subscribe to mailing list $ who $ Who is subscribed to list $? info $ Provide info on list $ help Request an info-help file igor Configuration Parameters (igor.conf): MyPubKey This remailers public key, non-traffic related encryption key. Used for encrypting traffic or data. MyOwnKey This remailers private key, non-traffic related de-cryption key. Used for decrypting traffic or data. MyPubRing My public key ring, this contains a mapping of each 'authorized' igor remailer we will operate with. We use this key to encrypt traffic TO the listed remailers. There are no line length limits. e.g. igor@foo.bar#242ds032fdsasetewdvdsasdfewwere... igor@bar.org#2303210343203828353234898324397... cypherpunks@ssz.com#23XD24398dDWSc35K2)3C2#d... ... MyOwnRing My private key ring, this contains a mapping of each 'authorized' igor remailer we will operate with. We use this key to decrypt traffic FROM the listed remailers. GHeader: $ Place this at the beginning of all emails through this remailer GFooter: $ Place this at the foot of all emails through this remailer Open: *, *, *, ... These mailing lists will provide all info to any reqeustor List: *, *, *, ... These mailing lists will provide info only to a current subscriber Close: *, *, *, ... These mailing lists will not provide any info Verify: *, *, *, ... These mailing lists always verify each operation through the Evil Geniuses. ArchDir $ The archive files should go in the $ directory Archive: *, *, *, ... These mailing lists will create an archive file, #.arc
participants (2)
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An Metet -
Jim Choate