Re: Traceable Infrastructure is as vulnerable as traceable messages.
At 8:43 PM +0200 8/3/01, Eugene Leitl wrote:
On Fri, 3 Aug 2001, Ray Dillinger wrote:
(2) The remailers themselves are not anonymous.
No, but to shut them down you have to know where they are, and to make your intent known to operators of such.
The remailers could reside in a state with a weak mutual enforcibility (Eastern Block successor states, Israel, developing countries). The remailers could be physically hidden in a large facility (of course, you could always whip up a firewall filter blocking them), or be connecting via 802.11b and successors. The remailers could be packaged as part of a well-behaved worm, thus overwhelming detection and enforcement capabilites.
Just so. And some of the recent "remailers can't work" critics (Dillinger, Farr) are breathtakingly ignorant of what was common knowledge in 1992. Worse, they haven't heeded recommendations that they get themselves up to speed. There is no sign that even the technologies described above (wireless, throwaways, worm-based, surreptitious, etc.) are needed to achieve excellent untraceability. A distributed set of remailers in N different jurisdictions is quite robust against prosecutorial fishing expeditions, though not as robust as we want against attacks by much more capable adversaries. Ways to increase robustness have been discussed many times. (Increase N, increase pool sizes at each stage, adopt constant-bandwidth approaches like Pipenet, throw in wireless and "rooms full of remailers" approaches, even adopt DC-Net methods as cores for sub-nets.) Dillinger and Farr have described only sophomoric attacks. Even the remailers of 1995-6 defeated the Scientologists. Crap about IP addresses being traceable is just obfuscation to cover basic ignorance of how remailer networks work. --Tim May -- Timothy C. May tcmay@got.net Corralitos, California Political: Co-founder Cypherpunks/crypto anarchy/Cyphernomicon Technical: physics/soft errors/Smalltalk/Squeak/agents/games/Go Personal: b.1951/UCSB/Intel '74-'86/retired/investor/motorcycles/guns
On Fri, 3 Aug 2001, Tim May wrote:
Dillinger and Farr have described only sophomoric attacks. Even the remailers of 1995-6 defeated the Scientologists.
Crap about IP addresses being traceable is just obfuscation to cover basic ignorance of how remailer networks work.
I'd suggest they take a look at ipchains/iptables in Linux. -- ____________________________________________________________________ Nature and Nature's laws lay hid in night: God said, "Let Tesla be", and all was light. B.A. Behrend The Armadillo Group ,::////;::-. James Choate Austin, Tx /:'///// ``::>/|/ ravage@ssz.com www.ssz.com .', |||| `/( e\ 512-451-7087 -====~~mm-'`-```-mm --'- --------------------------------------------------------------------
Tim May:
Just so. And some of the recent "remailers can't work" critics (Dillinger, Farr) are breathtakingly ignorant of what was common knowledge in 1992. Worse, they haven't heeded recommendations that they get themselves up to speed.
I didn't say that. I think Ray really did, either.
There is no sign that even the technologies described above (wireless, throwaways, worm-based, surreptitious, etc.) are needed to achieve excellent untraceability. A distributed set of remailers in N different jurisdictions is quite robust against prosecutorial fishing expeditions, though not as robust as we want against attacks by much more capable adversaries.
Ways to increase robustness have been discussed many times. (Increase N, increase pool sizes at each stage, adopt constant-bandwidth approaches like Pipenet, throw in wireless and "rooms full of remailers" approaches, even adopt DC-Net methods as cores for sub-nets.)
Dillinger and Farr have described only sophomoric attacks. Even the remailers of 1995-6 defeated the Scientologists.
Crap about IP addresses being traceable is just obfuscation to cover basic ignorance of how remailer networks work.
--Tim May
-- Timothy C. May tcmay@got.net Corralitos, California Political: Co-founder Cypherpunks/crypto anarchy/Cyphernomicon Technical: physics/soft errors/Smalltalk/Squeak/agents/games/Go Personal: b.1951/UCSB/Intel '74-'86/retired/investor/motorcycles/guns
-- On 3 Aug 2001, at 12:07, Tim May wrote:
A distributed set of remailers in N different jurisdictions is quite robust against prosecutorial fishing expeditions
As governments become more lawless, and laws become mere desires of the powerful, rather than any fixed set of rules, the state is increasing less one powerful entity, rather it becomes numerous entities each with their own conflicting desires. The danger is not that the US will turn into the Russia of the 1950s, but merely that it will turn into the Russia of the 1990s, a far less threatening prospect. --digsig James A. Donald 6YeGpsZR+nOTh/cGwvITnSR3TdzclVpR0+pr3YYQdkG qKJyYXYe2okyEhEp3rBXnrxcTNa1wfOGIuhA/0FY 4F/Y898UAwZpSU+bFjS1rygc8qLMNpT/4WDEJIc3w
On Sat, 4 Aug 2001 jamesd@echeque.com wrote:
As governments become more lawless, and laws become mere desires of the powerful, rather than any fixed set of rules, the state is increasing less one powerful entity, rather it becomes numerous entities each with their own conflicting desires.
The danger is not that the US will turn into the Russia of the 1950s, but merely that it will turn into the Russia of the 1990s, a far less threatening prospect.
Yowzer, we agree... The only significant long-term factor keeping this from happening even faster is the Chinese. It represents a consistent and 'universal' threat that motivates these splinter groups to unite in 'commen defence'. -- ____________________________________________________________________ Nature and Nature's laws lay hid in night: God said, "Let Tesla be", and all was light. B.A. Behrend The Armadillo Group ,::////;::-. James Choate Austin, Tx /:'///// ``::>/|/ ravage@ssz.com www.ssz.com .', |||| `/( e\ 512-451-7087 -====~~mm-'`-```-mm --'- --------------------------------------------------------------------
participants (5)
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Aimee Farr -
jamesd＠echeque.com -
Jim Choate -
Jim Choate -
Tim May