Going through all the messages on the Clipper, I noticed what may be a flaw that wasn't quite addressed... The family key, which is the same for all devices, is hardwired onto the chip with the algorithm. However, the device serial number and the unit key must be burned into a ROM. This is somewhat like the EIN/MIN burned into the ROM of a cellular phone. Just ask anyone who is familiar with cellular fraud how difficult it is to change the EIN/MIN of the phone. So it should be more than possible for anyone to throw a wrench into the system by using hacked phones that have a random device serial number. In this way it would not be possible for authorities to obtain the proper unit key since the device serial number would not exist in the escrow authority's database or would have the incorrect unit key associated with it. Of course, it is possible that the scheme (i.e. the algorithm and the handshaking) is not secure. Assuming it is not truly secure, I would think that only such agencies as the NSA and FBI would have not only the resources to decrypt Clipper generated communications without the session key, but the resources to keep such equipment from public knowledge (i.e. there is a companion device that breaks such communications). It would most likely be too difficult to keep such equipment secret if it were available to local and state authorities. Furthermore, the whole idea of escrow agents is hogwash to me. How difficult is it to get someone's credit report? How difficult is it to get social security records on a person? Apparently no information held by a government or even private agency like TRW is impossible or even exceedingly difficult to obtain, and anyone wishing to intercept your communications will simply have to buy off the appropriate persons at each escrow authority. To sum up, I think the whole idea stinks. andrew