Let me see if I've got your personal fantasy correct, because that's all it is. You believe that it is best to design a protocol that is somewhat resistant, and simply ignore it's faults. I strongly disagree, doing that is to put it bluntly stupid. The real game is to design a protocol and make it's strengths and weaknesses known. Anything else is just more stupidity. And for the record, I'm far from new. Joe ----- Original Message ----- From: "David Honig" <honig@sprynet.com> To: "Joseph Ashwood" <ashwood@msn.com>; <cypherpunks@einstein.ssz.com> Sent: Thursday, August 09, 2001 12:01 PM Subject: CDR: Re: re: Remailer Phases
At 09:05 PM 8/7/01 -0500, Joseph Ashwood wrote:
----- Original Message ----- From: "A. Melon" <juicy@melontraffickers.com> Subject: re: Remailer Phases
2. Operator probably trustworthy
Impossible, and unnecessary. Don't assume any remops are trustworthy.
Actually it is absolutely necessary. If all operators are willing to collude, then your precious anonymity is completely lost.
Joe, you're obviously new to the game.
The game is, design a protocol where you are resistant to some, but not complete collusion (aka node failure). And analyze as best you can your protocol's fault tree, including succeptibility to collusion.