On Tue, 27 Jan 1998, Tim May wrote:
A LAM approach is low tech, and can be implemented easily enough. (And PipeNet becomes much more feasible...)
I agree.
Even an adventurous company, with many machines on various networks, could deploy a LAM on their network.
There are several such companies outside the US that I can think of.
(Though the laws about corporate culpability are written in ways that a Silicon Graphics or Sun or C2Net would have much to fear in having their corporate network associated with a LAM of any sort. Hence my point about many and varied residential users in a physical building being the LAM nodes.)
Sure. A LAM would not happen at any of the above companies. But there are several non-US ISP's and other outfits with triple fiber to the backbone that could set this up. [You know who I am talking about, lurkers. :-) How about it]?
Another point about LAMs is that they are useful as "concentrators" for PipeNet connections. To wit,
Suppose someone has deployed a PipeNet connection to another node. Fine, but the NSA and Mossad and GCHQ and other enemies of freedom may watch the traffic flowing into the node feeding that PipeNet connection.
So why not do a better job of "loading" this PipeNet connection by having a LAM at the site? Then, watchers see the stuff flowing into the LAM, and have less idea (correlation-wise) of what's then making use of the PipeNet connection.
That setup would work even better if operated by a major ISP. If you run 10% of a country's (and be it a small country) IP traffic through a LAM, the computations an attacker has to perform become complex to the point of being intractable. Especially if the ISP runs dial-up. [Lurkers, your thoughs please]? Of course we won't see such sites until somebody writes the software. Cypherpunks write code, -- Lucky Green <shamrock@cypherpunks.to> PGP v5 encrypted email preferred. "Tonga? Where the hell is Tonga? They have Cypherpunks there?"