This fellow has written a nice summary of the "carrot and stick" motivations on Clipper. Nothing we haven't seen discussed, but a nice synopsis. His analysis is accurate: - the government will make Clipper use very easy to export, and to use (perhaps by subsidizing production costs of the MYK-xx chip for some time) - the government will make non-Clipper use very hard to export, may harrass those who post code to ftp sites (a la PGP, Moby Crypt, etc.), and will do other things to throw roadblocks up - the result will probably be that in 5 years mosts crypto use is of the key escrow sort, with all that that implies Comment from TCM: Yes, we've "already won" in some sense, in that strong crypto can't be completely eliminated. But if 99% of all crypto users are using key escrow in 1999, for practical reasons, then in some sense we have lost. I'm curious about what RSA Data Security Inc. thinks of all this, as this carrot-and-stick move worsens the export situation immmensely: key escrow technologies get a "pass," while non key escrow technologies get scrutinized, delayed, and generally told not to bother to try to export (this is my interpretation). Could be real bad news for Bidzos and Company. (Don't flame me for urging an alliance with RSADSI! I'm just speculating on who will be hit hard here. Could have some implications for what Cypherpunks support.) Here's the article: Newsgroups: alt.activism,alt.politics.datahighway,alt.privacy,alt.privacy.clipper,alt.security.pgp,alt.wired,comp.org.eff.talk,talk.politics.crypto From: shephard@fraser.sfu.ca (Gordon Shephard) Subject: Re: CRYPTO: DoJ's new rules for access to Clipper keys Message-ID: <shephard.760538361@sfu.ca> Sender: news@sfu.ca (seymour news) Organization: Simon Fraser University, Burnaby, B.C., Canada Distribution: inet Date: Sun, 6 Feb 1994 12:39:21 GMT Lines: 107 strnlght@netcom.com (David Sternlight) writes:
You still don't get it. Clipper is a system for the private sector with good security except for the escrow. The escrow is there to prevent the bad guys from using what would otherwise be a very hard to break system.
This reveals some of the mindset behind Government encryption policy. For the past year or so, I've been discussing the "Clipper Concept", and have constantly bewildered myself and others with the question: Why on earth would the black hats use a system which can be compromised by law enforcement agencies? The conclusion which we normally came to was that after the introduction of Clipper technology, the United States Government would work towards making it illegal for cryptographic systems other than Clipper (or some other Government controlled Key Escrow system) to be sold or produced in the United States. Now, Mr. Sternlight's view that Government is not attempting to prevent black hats from using non-clipper technology, and that they simply do not wish to allow criminals to use the Governments strong encryption system, contrasts somewhat with the current dialogue on the subject. And it makes sense - Clipper is going to dominate the market. We may all strut about and swear up and down how we will never use a cryptographic system which the Government can break, but, given that commerical providers will probably have huge incentives to develop clipper chip systems, (Govt. Contracts and such :) this is the system that you and I will probably be purchasing. A careful re-reading of the Press Releases provides supporting evidence. In particular, the administration will allow export of key escrow technologies, and their new policies will result in: - expedited delivery of products - reduced shipping and reporting costs - fewer individual licenses - personal exemptions for the use of encryption technology taken out of the country by business persons. The administration is going to also work with industry, with the NIST leading these efforts. Mention was made of money being tossed into this effort (Staff will be hired....) So, that's the carrot, now for the stick: "The Administration will continue to restrict export of the most sophisticated encryption devices." So, picture in your mind a Company such as AT&T, or U.S. Robotics, that is about to start selling an encrypting modem/telephone: They can either provide to Joe Public a Key Escrow technology, or they can put together their own proprietary encryption system. The Key Escrow technology system can be sold to the U.S. Government (Big Bucks, How much would you like to bet that in the next 3 or 4 years, numerous government departments will be allocated large sums of money to purchase encryption devices, regardless of whether they need it or not - The press releases reveal that All Govt. Purchases will be Key Escrow - Never underestimate the impact of Government contracts) The Key Escrow technology system will be free of Red Tape, can be exported, will not require individual licensing for each country, can be taken out of the country by business persons (The vast majority of which could care less whether the Govt. can crack their communications, it's the competition they are concerned about), etc, etc.... Or, they can create a proprietary system and face the mother of all red tape trying to sell the damn thing (At a significantly increased cost.) The Result: 1) Commerical Companies will not produce Non Key Escrow Technology. 2) The few that do, will have their lives made so difficult by the Administration, it will be difficult to find their product. And this is an issue that Nobody seems to discuss: Encryption is only useful if BOTH ends of the communciation line are using the same encryption technology. Who will you be able to talk to if you are using a proprietary encryption system. (A technically alert member of the press should ask the following question: Will the administration seek to prevent encryption systems which incorporate the clipper chip from having secondary encryption technolgies embedded (I.E. Imagine if the modem you manufactured could only talk V.32terbo, and not V.32/V.32bis - Nobody would buy it because everyone else has a V.32bis modem. ) And here is where the Government may have made a strategic error though; by not revealing their encryption algorithm, they may have opened up a market for people who are concerned about the strength of the encryption algorithm. E.G. AT&T can come along and market their encrypting telephones with multiple levels of security, standard "Clipper" encryption, or new and improved AT&T laboratory technology which has been attacked by every encryption researcher on the planet. Of course this device would still face the Red tape which the government will be using as its primary weapon against non key escrow technology in the coming years. You heard it here first. (Well, maybe not. Anyone hear how the Government has been treating PGP lately? :) | Gordon Harry Shephard, shephard@sfu.ca,(message)252-4387, (res)524-8622 | In No Way am I speaking for my Employers or Simon Fraser University. --