Re: options for anonymous return Marc writes:
1. Remailer memorizes a pseudonym.
2. The anonymous message includes a cryptographic "stamped self-addressed envelope" which contains a layered list of remailer addresses encrypted at each layer.
3. The reply to an anonymous message can be posted in a public place encrypted for a key known only to the sender.
Have I missed any important methods?
A variant of (1) greatly increases the security. Have the remailer memorize an anonymous return address of type (2). The information that is contained in a remailer then, per pseudonym, is a. the pseudonym b. the address of the next remailer to use c. a block of stuff to be prepended to the outgoing mail. Presumably this is forwarding instructions for the next remailer. It would also be encrypted with the public key of the next remailer. Thus, even if the whole pseudonym mapping list were compromised, it would only reveal a list of sites to try and compromise next. And at some point the private remailer keys have to be compromised as well, since all the remailing instruction are encrypted with them. This system can also be chained, creating "routing pseudonyms" on various remailers and encrypted instructions pointing one pseudonym to another. Eric