5 Nov
2003
5 Nov
'03
10:13 p.m.
-- I want fully deniable information storage -- information theoretic deniable, not merely steganographic deniable, for stenography can never be wholly secure. So I would have a fixed sized block of data containing a variable number of smaller secret chunks of data. A random key would extract a random length of gibberish, a valid key would extract a stream of valid data, and revealing one secret key to the adversary would not give the adversary any evidene that more secrety keys were present or absent. Any good known algorithms for this? --digsig James A. Donald 6YeGpsZR+nOTh/cGwvITnSR3TdzclVpR0+pr3YYQdkG E/45zLbSQGo9twu/KUBNIOlEXbRyhzQ7Y3BaLVsF 41igtTR/jdGIfGHEe9yPuW0cL6FbO81L4da208BC1