Dear p2p-hackers, After thinking about the similarities between the commons issues faced by the PaulGardner-Stephen's Serval project & Zooko's Tahoe LAFS, I was motivated try (yet again!) to refine my understanding of currency systems, barter and money. I'd like some help! These concepts seem to have direct bearing on problems that arise when bootstrapping new users into a p2p/mesh system, trust, credit, fairness protocols & so on, yet I lack a standard terminology for talking about them in a precise way. First, I'd like to share a speculation: My guess is that it would be best if Tahoe LAFS computed all credits and debits in terms of its native "commodity currencies" (this term is defined below) like storage, availability, bandwidth, latency, and priority, and then possibly mapped these things to other currencies via forward contracts in a fairly pluggable manner. While Bitcoins might be interesting as one of several possible side-channels to establish "credit" for the system's own native currencies when dealing with non-boostrapped strangers, or for those who would otherwise hit their "debt ceiling", I'm hoping that friends could still offer credits for "native" commodities denominated as such *directly*, without needing to think about a fluctuating 3rd-party / non-native currency abstraction. That said, here's my first shot at defining a few terms, along with a note to the Serval project that may be of more general interest: o Benefit That which produces a net increase in some desired state of being. o Intrinsic value Non-bartered perceived benefit. o Value Optimally bartered perceived benefit. o Money The mathematical abstraction of value Note: this can be a positive or negative quantity. o Currency The concrete manifestation of money. Note: currency always has a non-negative value. Example: physical dollars & coins. o Pure liability Something of negative value that isn't the result of owing anybody something. Example: an inadequate reputation o Debt A liability resulting from owing something of positive value to another party. o Pure asset Positive value that isn't the result of someone owing you. Example: good health. o Credit A liability that another party owes to you and recognizes. o Commodity currency Some fungible good or service that is easy measurable and comparable, transferable and transportable, sufficiently divisible and durable, widely bartered with known rates of exchange, and derives its value from its intrinsic usefulness rather than its role as a currency or as an item of speculation predicated on the existence of a greater fool. Example: cigarettes in a POW camp. o Native commodity currency A commodity currency whose production and consumption are intrinsic to the economy itself. Example: Carpool rides in a ride-sharing network. o Collectible currency Like a commodity currency, except that its value comes from the mutual speculation of those who create demand for it, rather than its intrinsic worth to any end user. Example 1: Bitcoin is a perfect example of a collectible currency because its intrinsic worth is exactly zero (you can't even use them to line the bottom of a bird cage). Example 2: Gold and silver are best thought of as being somewhere between commodity and collectible currencies; however, the volatility of silver prices relative to its supply and industrial demand shows it's more on the speculation- driven "collectible" side if things. o Fiat obligation currency Like a collectible currency, except that every unit created represents the transfer of value from someone who has actually produced a good or service of non-zero intrinsic worth to a person or institution that has offered nothing in exchange for it but the currency itself. Crucially, the production of fiat obligation currency is restricted by law, and demand for it is created by requiring its use. Hence, every unit represents a claim by its producer to simply extract things of actual value from those who cannot create the currency themselves, and yet are bound to use it by law or necessity. Example: The deceptively named "Fed", a group of privately owned for-profit banks, create legal tender (US dollars) out of thin air, then "exchange" them for US Treasury for T-bills. The T-bills have real value in that they represent fractional ownership of the US government's ability to extract goods and services from its own citizens, and from the citizens of foreign countries. To do this at home, it puses the IRS, federal marshals, and the legal system. Abroad, it uses military and/or political power to enforce its will directly, or it can use intermediaries in its thrall, such as the IMF, The World Bank, various resource-rich or strategic client governments, and so-called "Coalitions of the Willing". Hence, every dollar represents the assertion of a one-sided obligation; they aren't coupons for anything of intrinsic value that the Fed used to barter with the US Treasury in exchange for a fraction of the tribute our government is able to demand. Instead, they are more like souvenirs commemorating an outright confiscation of it that has already taken place. The obscene material wealth and power held by those happy few who are on the receiving end of this arrangement is the direct result of the compulsory exchange of intrinsically valuable goods and services for inherently valueless slips of paper decorated with stars, eagles, and the faces of dead presidents. o Fiat commonwealth currency Like a fiat obligation currency, except that the value extracted in the process of its creation goes to the community's own public fund, rather than being siphoned off by a private aristocracy. Example (I think): Treasury-issued "United States Notes". ----------------------------------------------------------------- Here are some comments I made to the Serval project recently. I'd love to get some feedback on them. Hopefully, the ideas I'm tossing around are of wide enough applicability to merit general interest and/or or an informed & corrective critique ----------------------------------------------------------------- Serval already has at least three commodities with universal value, and native non-speculative demand: bandwidth, latency, and priority. Using these in combination with a system of reputation and credit as a "commodity currency" makes a lot more sense than dragging in a collectible currency. Assuming nodes in a Serval mesh are free to associate in different virtual communities of reputation (as humans do in real life), all a community needs to do is restrict mesh access ("the commons") in ways it sees fit to discourage behavior it dislikes, or grant special credit for positive actions (eg: donating bandwidth, particularly in times of shortage). It seems as though you could even model the policies of Serval "community" as an autonomous System (AS) on the Internet, and then go on to think about communities honoring each other's credits with bandwidth, latency, and priority as parameters like a AS-AS forex. This would keep every community free from central domination by other groups, yet open to engage in mutually beneficial data transfers. It seems likely that a few huge communities would naturally arise, along with lots of little ones. Users might like to have different policies for each of them, as different levels of generosity (or blind trust) might be appropriate; one might have reputations in personal groups, affinity, regional/global, etc. It seems like the core requirement is the ability to assign a policy profile to a group ID, and the ability to have more than one. If someone with a sufficiently large balance and community reputation never gets bumped by somebody who might be free-riding or has no reputation, it makes sense to build a positive and credible "accounts receivable" bandwidth balance. Someone could always cheat you with a series of bogus IDs, if doing so entails them being second-class citizens the entire time, there isn't much incentive. I think it's good to place the main focus on first degree contacts, as has been done with great success in hawala networks. The hawala system is well known for its efficiency and real-world security, even over wide geographical areas lacking any common authority sanctioned to use powers of state (such as garnishment) in order to enforce contracts. Reputation-based access to the commons can go a long way to regulate behavior. Diamond traders that operate via handshake agreements are another nice example of regulation by community restriction. More generally, the principles and practices of Islamic banking look like they're worthy of serious study. I've only begun to explore this topic, but the prohibition against outright interest seems to have generated a fascinating array of partnership-oriented contracts and non-leveraged financial relationships -- all with a bare minimum of bookkeeping. If an adversary's goal is to hunt down all copies of a message and destroy it, another consideration emerges: perservering ignorance. Example: Julian Assange has no idea how to reclaim all copies of insurance.aes256; therefore, he cannot be forced to help anybody else do so either, even under the threat of torture. Had a recording been made of every person who downloaded the file, then thugs could go after these people too, even if they number in the tens of thousands. However, what if these folks placed the same data on the net in a way that couldn't be detected, and was then downloaded by yet another set of people that's unknown to the first group. The same logic applies to the release of the key to unlock the encrypted data. You probably want some sort of anonymous quorum where the various members don't actually know all the other members, but share an ability to look at a common "outer envelope" wrapping a sig and an inner blob. The disconnected cliques have these blob-bearing coconuts floating between them, yet the inner blob part within the coconut cannot be cracked solo by any one clique; however portions of the key to crack it can be posted publicly by them (in any form: wrapped by the group envelope or not, steganographically or not, signed or not, and so on). Cheers, -Jon _______________________________________________ p2p-hackers mailing list p2p-hackers@lists.zooko.com http://lists.zooko.com/mailman/listinfo/p2p-hackers ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.ativel.com http://postbiota.org 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE