This file <TESTIM.TXT> was obtained from the National Institute of Standards and Technology. - 8<------- Cut Here ------------ STATEMENT OF RAYMOND G. KAMMER ACTING DIRECTOR, NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF STANDARDS AND TECHNOLOGY BEFORE THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON TELECOMMUNICATIONS AND FINANCE COMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND COMMERCE APRIL 29, 1993 Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee: Good morning. Thank you for inviting me to testify. I am Raymond G. Kammer, Acting Director of the National Institute of Standards and Technology of the U.S. Department of Commerce. Under the Computer Security Act of 1987, NIST is responsible for the development of standards for protecting unclassified government computer systems, except those commonly known as Warner Amendment systems (as defined in Title 10 USC 2315). NIST has a long-established program of developing computer security guidelines and standards for federal agencies. Many of these are also used, on a voluntary basis, by the private sector. We have published guidance on computer security training and awareness, identification and authentication, open systems security, incident response, cryptographic standards, trusted systems, and many other facets of computer security. Today, however, I plan to address the following topics which I believe are most directly germane to your invitation: * The need for good information security technology to protect computer and telecommunications systems and networks; * NIST's activities in telecommunications switch security; * the planned recertification of the Data Encryption Standard; * NIST's proposed Digital Signature Standard; * the recent White House announcement of a new encryption technology, called the Clipper Chip; and * the President's directive to review advanced telecommunications and encryption technology. Need for Computer Security Strong security technology is required in modern communications systems and networks to protect sensitive and valuable information. Government agencies and private corporations depend upon the integrity and availability of their communications system in order to do business. Computer viruses, network worms, hackers, and other threats against our systems emphasize the importance of telecommunications security. Additionally, I have grown convinced, through strong anecdotal evidence, most of it shared on a proprietary basis, of the growing threat to American business from "economic espionage." Much has been reported in the press of the activities of foreign intelligence services targeting American firms, and sharing their findings with competing foreign firms. I am convinced that American firms need strong security, and in particular, strong cryptography, to protect against such threats. More importantly, the Administration is committed to working with the private sector to spur the development of a National Information Infrastructure which will use new telecommunications and computer technologies to give Americans unprecedented access to information. This infrastructure of high-speed networks ("information superhighways") will transmit video, images, HDTV programming, and huge data files as easily as today's telephone system transmits voice. Appropriate security techniques may at times be integrated into such systems. Telecommunications Security Federal telephone and computer networks depend upon reliable and secure telecommunications capabilities, both of long-distance carriers and local private-branch exchanges (PBXs). To examine security issues of telecommunications networks, including issues of PBX security and telecommunications switch security, NIST is currently setting up a Telecommunications Security Analysis Center. This Center will expand on initial research we have conducted on the vulnerability of telecommunications switches. Telecommunications switches are an integral part of the security of the public switched network. Security problems in switches can result in serious problems such as toll fraud, unauthorized and illegal eavesdropping, or the disabling of switches, which would result in bringing down part of the public switched network. NIST has been monitoring the growth of switch-related abuse and has been analyzing switches to be able to address the types of crimes that could be perpetrated in the future. This work includes studying the growing ease of perpetrating these crimes. There are several areas of concern: * Toll fraud. Current research indicates that the problem is well over $1 billion per year. While not all toll-fraud is accomplished technically, telecommunications switches are vulnerable to hackers who can gain unauthorized access to the use of long-distance services. This is a particular vulnerability to the owners of PBXs, who can lose considerable sums if their systems are inadequately protected. Good system configuration control is one good security measure we are examining. * Network Availability. There have been no cases of intruders purposefully bringing down parts of the public switched network. The President's National Security Telecommunications Advisory Committee (NSTAC) concluded that "Until there is confidence that strong comprehensive computer security programs are in place, the industry should assume that a motivated and resourceful adversary in one concerted manipulation of the network software could degrade at least portions of the PSN." * Unauthorized Eavesdropping. If unauthorized access is gained to telecommunications switches, which is really just a computer that switches phone calls, a hacker can gain access to the contents of phone conversations and other information transmitted through a switch. This unauthorized eavesdropping can be either "real-time," as the conversations occur, or the intruders can arrange to have the conversations and data electronically transmitted to another telecommunications switch or computer for later analysis. The purpose of the Telecommunications Security Analysis Center will be to: * Develop tools and techniques to analyze very complex systems such as switches; * Provide informal security guidance and advice to federal agencies on procurement of telecommunications switches; * Perform security analyses of commercial switches in both laboratory and real world environments; and * Develop standards and guidance for use in securing switches and in building more secure switches, while providing for the legitimate needs of law enforcement, under proper court order, to protect the American public. As we pursue this research, we will be pleased to provide additional information on our findings to the Committee. The Data Encryption Standard The current government standard for the encryption of data is known as the Data Encryption Standard (DES), which was first approved as a Federal Information Processing Standard in 1977. DES is widely used within both the government and the private sector for the protection of sensitive information, including financial information, medical information, and Privacy Act data. DES represents a proven twenty year old technology with DES products available in the marketplace for the last 15 years. Last year, NIST formally solicited comments on the recertification of DES. After reviewing those comments, and the other technical inputs that I have received, I plan to recommend to the Secretary of Commerce that he recertify DES for another five years. I also plan to suggest to the Secretary that when we announce the recertification we state our intention to consider alternatives to it over the next five years. By putting that announcement on the table, we hope to give people an opportunity to comment on orderly technological transitions. In the meantime, we need to consider the large installed base of systems that rely upon this proven standard. NIST's Proposed Digital Signature Standard The majority of the cryptographic-based security requirements in computer and network systems involve the need for strong identification and authentication. One method which we believe holds a capacity for significant improvements in security and also cost- savings by automating paper processes is the use of digital signatures. A digital signature is a computer-based method of "sealing" an electronic message in such a way that its contents cannot be changed or forged without detection and that the identity of the originator of the communication can be verified. The digital signature for a message is simply a code, or large number, that is unique for each message and each message originator (within a very high, known probability). A digital signature is computed for a message by computing a representation of the message (called a "hash" code) and a cryptographic process that uses a key associated with the message originator. Any party with access to the public key, message, and signature can verify the signature. If the signature verifies correctly, the receiver (or any other party) has confidence that the message was signed by the owner of the public key and the message has not been altered after it was signed. In 1991, NIST proposed a draft Digital Signature Standard (DSS). We received about 130 public comments. We have been reviewing these comments and revising the standard as appropriate to respond to those comments. Additionally, we have examined and are currently dealing with two claims of patent infringement, which we believe will be successfully resolved in the not-too-distant future. Once this occurs, the Secretary of Commerce needs to decide to approve the DSS as a Federal Information Processing Standard. It will then complement the Secure Hash Standard which was recently approved by the Secretary of Commerce as Federal Information Processing Standard 180. We anticipate that the DSS will find many uses within government computer systems and networks. For example, DSS could be employed in electronic funds transfer systems. Suppose an electronic funds transfer message is generated to request that $100.00 be transferred from one account to another. If the message was passed over an unprotected network, it may be possible for an adversary to alter the message and request a transfer of $1000.00. Without additional information, it would be difficult, if not impossible, for the receiver to know the message had been altered. However if the DSS was used to sign the message before it was sent, the receiver would know the message had been altered because it would not verify correctly. The transfer request could then be denied. DSS could be employed in a variety of business applications requiring a replacement of handwritten signatures. One example is Electronic Data Interchange (EDI). EDI is the computer-to-computer interchange of messages representing business documents. In the federal government, this technology is being used to procure goods and services. Digital signatures could be used to replace handwritten signatures in these EDI transactions. For instance, contracts between the government and its vendors could be negotiated electronically. A government procurement official could post an electronically signed message requesting bids for office supplies. Vendors wishing to respond to the request may first verify the message before they respond. This assures that the contents of the message have not been altered and that the request was signed by a legitimate procurement official. After verifying the bid request, the vendor could generate and sign an electronic bid. Upon receiving the bid, the procurement official could verify that the vendor's bid was not altered after it was signed. If the bid is accepted, the electronic message could be passed to a contracting office to negotiate the final terms of the contract. The final contract could be digitally signed by both the contracting office and the vendor. If a dispute arose at some later time, the contents of contract and the associated signatures could be verified by a third party. DSS is also likely to find widespread applications in the health care field. It might be used to sign digital images, for example, to assure that they remain safe against unauthorized modifications. DSS could also be useful in the distribution of software. A digital signature could be applied to software after it has been validated and approved for distribution. Before installing the software on a computer, the signature could be verified to be sure no unauthorized changes (such as the addition of a virus) have been made. The digital signature could be verified periodically to ensure the integrity of the software. In database applications, the integrity of information stored in the database is often essential. DSS could be employed in a variety of database applications to provide integrity. For example, information could be signed when it was entered into the database. To maintain integrity, the system could also require that all updates or modifications to the information be signed. Before signed information was viewed by a user, the signature could be verified. If the signature verified correctly, the user would know the information was not altered by an unauthorized party. The system could also include signatures in the audit information to provide a record of users who modified the information. The DSS can also be used in conjunction with more secure identification and authentication systems, for the protection of access to both computer and telecommunication systems. A New Encryption Technology: The Clipper Chip Approximately two weeks ago, the White House announced our intention, based on a new encryption technology, the Clipper Chip, to initiate a voluntary program to improve the security and privacy of telephone communications while meeting the legitimate needs of law enforcement. This initiative will involve the creation of new products to accelerate the development and use of advanced and secure telecommunications networks and wireless communications links - the security of the very systems you are examining here today. Sophisticated encryption technology, including the DES, has been used for years to protect electronic funds transfer. It is now being used to protect electronic mail and computer files. While encryption technology can help Americans protect business secrets and the unauthorized release of personal information, it also can be used by terrorists, drug dealers, and other criminals. A state-of-the-art microcircuit, the "Clipper Chip," has been developed by government engineers. The chip represents a new approach to encryption technology. It can be used in new, relatively inexpensive encryption devices that can be attached to an ordinary telephone. It scrambles telephone communications using an encryption algorithm that is more powerful than many in commercial use today. The Clipper algorithm with an 80 bit long cryptographic key is approximately 16 million times stronger than DES. It would take a CRAY YMP over 200 years to solve one DES key. It would take the same machine over a billion years to solve one Clipper Chip key. This new technology offers opportunities for companies to protect proprietary information, protect the privacy of personal phone conversations and prevent unauthorized release of data transmitted electronically. At the same time this technology preserves the ability of federal, state and local law enforcement agencies to intercept lawfully the phone conversations of criminals. Protection of confidentiality of information is of critical concern to the nation. So too is the ability of law enforcement to provide safe streets and neighborhoods. Americans demand the very best in law enforcement - at the federal, state and local level. Citizens insist upon a quick response to terrorist threats, organized crime, and drug dealers, while preserving our Constitutional rights. Past experience clearly shows that one critical technology successfully used to prosecute organized crime is the use of court-authorized wiretaps. Unquestionably, these lawful electronic intercepts have saved lives and been critical to bringing criminals to justice. The "Clipper Chip" is also a powerful tool which will be used by law enforcement to protect its own sensitive communications from illicit criminal monitoring. A "key-escrow" system is envisioned that would ensure that the "Clipper Chip" is used to protect the privacy of law-abiding Americans. Each device containing the chip will have two unique "keys," numbers that will be needed by authorized government agencies to decode messages encoded by the device. When the device is manufactured, the two keys would be deposited separately in two "key- escrow" data bases established by the Attorney General. Access to these keys would be limited to government officials with legal authorization to conduct a wiretap. The President has asked the Attorney General to make arrangements with appropriate entities who would hold the keys for the key-escrow microcircuits installed in communications equipment. I understand that the Attorney General is currently studying these procedures and options for who will serve as the key escrow holders. Since the announcement from the White House, I have stressed that the "Clipper Chip" technology provides law enforcement with no new authorities to access the content of the private conversations of Americans. Also, some have claimed that there is a hidden trapdoor in the chip or the algorithm. I cannot state it more simply: no trapdoor exists. The chip is an important step in addressing the problem of encryption's dual-edge sword: encryption helps to protect the privacy of individuals and industry, but it also can shield criminals and terrorists. We need the "Clipper Chip" and other approaches that can both provide law-abiding citizens with access to the encryption they need and prevent criminals from using it to hide their illegal activities. Presidential Directive for Advanced Telecommunications and Encryption Review In order to assess technology trends and explore new approaches and technologies (like the key-escrow system), the President has directed government agencies to develop a comprehensive policy on encryption and advanced telecommunications technology that accommodates: * the privacy of our citizens, including the need to employ voice or data encryption for business purposes; * the ability of authorized officials to access telephone calls and data, under proper court or other legal order, when necessary to protect our citizens; * the effective and timely use of the most modern technology to build the National Information Infrastructure needed to promote economic growth and the competitiveness of American industry in the global marketplace; and * the need of U.S. companies to manufacture and export high technology products. The President has directed early and frequent consultations with affected industries, the Congress and groups that advocate the privacy rights of individuals as policy options are developed. I anticipate being a member of the governmental review panel which will study this issue. I will again stress what we have stated previously. Encryption technology will play an increasingly important role in future network infrastructures and the Federal Government must act quickly to develop consistent, comprehensive policies regarding its use. The Administration is committed to policies that protect all Americans' right to privacy while also protecting them from those who break the law. Thank you Mr. Chairman, I would be pleased to answer any questions. Paul Ferguson | Uncle Sam wants to read Network Integrator | your e-mail... Centreville, Virginia USA | Just say "NO" to the Clipper fergp@sytex.com | Chip... -------------------------------+------------------------------ I love my country, but I fear it's government.