At 12:24 PM 7/17/95 -0500, Phil Fraering wrote:
I'd also like to point out that this system indicates that during an attack/disruption on a traditional dc-net, the disruptor can tell what the original person was trying to send, even though noone else can.
And then perhaps XOR the data with something offensive, and if the original sender tries to re-send, broadcast the result of the XOR, resulting in a total net output of the offensive material.
That's difficult - you have to identify that the sender is sending the same message while the message is being sent, rather than one or two bit-times later, and you can't fake encryption with an unknown keyid or digital signatures. (Digital signatures aren't something everybody would use very often on a DC-net, since the purpose of the net is to be anonymous, but since you can do anonymous broadcasts, you can anonymously post a signature key for your nym if you want to.) Also, there's no need to combine jamming and posting an offensive message; they both work well separately. I suppose you could do that if you only want to harass the net a bit (e.g. replace all trafic to remailer X with new remail to whitehouse.gov, or replace all postings from Cancelmoose with complaints about censorship), but basically DCnets degrade rapidly if the social structure of the net members does. # Thanks; Bill # Bill Stewart, Freelance Information Architect, stewarts@ix.netcom.com