Lucky Green <shamrock@netcom.com> writes:
At 4:17 1/24/96, Timothy C. May wrote:
The usual issue: That if a foreign-originated product even appears to be a standard (so far, none have been), and includes strong crypto, then the NSA and other agencies will simply change the rules. Thus, if extremely strong crypto from "Netscape-Zurich" starts to have a significant market presense in the U.S., then some law will be passed to restrict it.
I agree. The reason for enforcing ITAR is to keep good crypto of the *domestic* market. If ITAR no longer accomplishes that, new laws will be passed.
No need for any new laws or regulations, all that needs to be done is to add crypto to the import list (the opposite, and currently not so widely discussed counter part to the export list). In fact I wouldn't be suprised if the ODTC and NSA could interpret ITAR and the current import list to allow this. (Anyone have an electronic copy of the import restricted list?) Of course this wouldn't be a very popular move, so I'd guess that it wouldn't be tried until a) foreign crypto apps become a significant obstacle to the NSA, and b) other methods have been exhausted. Adam -- #!/bin/perl -s-- -export-a-crypto-system-sig -RSA-3-lines-PERL $m=unpack(H.$w,$m."\0"x$w),$_=`echo "16do$w 2+4Oi0$d*-^1[d2%Sa 2/d0<X+d*La1=z\U$n%0]SX$k"[$m*]\EszlXx++p|dc`,s/^.|\W//g,print pack('H*',$_)while read(STDIN,$m,($w=2*$d-1+length$n&~1)/2)