On Sun, 17 Dec 1995, Jay Holovacs wrote:
On Sun, 17 Dec 1995, Black Unicorn wrote:
I disagree. Instead it implies that interception and administrative review of content will be tolerated where it is "a necessary incident to the rendition of his service or to the protection of the rights or property of the provider of that service." Note that it will be the provider who makes the definition in the ex ante application.
The provider is allowed access ONLY for QC purposes.
This is only explicit with regards to public providers. Getting back to thhe
original point, the provider's ability to interpret the contents of the message is in no way required to monitor the system and cannot be used as a justification in itself for prohibiting use of crypto.
Oh? What if I say that I need to monitor e-mail for data corruption? Also, you might consider the definition of "intercept." I suspect it's a bit wider than you are accounting for.
Also, what if someone outside the system emails encrypted messages to the user. What authority would the sys admin have there??
Entirely unrelated to the statute you cite.
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