On Sun, 4 Jul 2004, Dave Emery wrote:
Would you care to comment on any technical or other details ?
I do not have the detailed technical details I would have liked - I did ask some of these types of questions and received little more than careful "decline to answer"s. What I do know is that this type of monitoring is being done on a regular, although limited scale, in FISA proceedings. The targets are generally CRT emissions, and the distance between target and acquisition gear is under .5 miles - still a shocking range which I was totally unprepared for. I engaged one of the operators in a discussion about the tempest resistant typefaces, and he was unaware of them. Food for thought... Interestingly, I have had more than one report of aural acquistion of typists keystrokes being used to attempt to calculate the content of a short keysequence (I assume a password is what was meant by "short keysequence"). These reports indicated "poor, but occasionally lucky results". I have also been told that there is a broadcasting keyboard cable inline device which is in wide use (this is pretty easy to do, but requires blackbagging - something that was a lot more limited prior to 9/11). -- Yours, J.A. Terranson sysadmin@mfn.org "...justice is a duty towards those whom you love and those whom you do not. And people's rights will not be harmed if the opponent speaks out about them." Osama Bin Laden