----- Original Message ----- From: "Ben Laurie" <ben@algroup.co.uk>
The important part for this, is that TCPA has no key until it has an owner, and the owner can wipe the TCPA at any time. From what I can tell this was designed for resale of components, but is perfectly suitable as a point of attack.
If this is true, I'm really happy about it, and I agree it would allow virtualisation. I'm pretty sure it won't be for Palladium, but I don't know about TCPA - certainly it fits the bill for what TCPA is supposed to do.
I certainly don't believe many people to believe me simply because I say it is so. Instead I'll supply a link to the authority of TCPA, the 1.1b specification, it is available at http://www.trustedcomputing.org/docs/main%20v1_1b.pdf . There are other documents, unfortunately the main spec gives substantial leeway, and I haven't had time to read the others (I haven't fully digested the main spec yet either). From that spec, all 332 pages of it, I encourage everyone that wants to decide for themselves to read the spec. If you reach different conclusions than I have, feel free to comment, I'm sure there are many people on these lists that would be interested in justification for either position. Personally, I believe I've processed enough of the spec to state that TCPA is a tool, and like any tool it has both positive and negative aspects. Provided the requirement to be able to turn it off (and for my preference they should add a requirement that the motherboard continue functioning even under the condition that the TCPA module(s) is/are physically removed from the board). The current spec though does seem to have a bend towards being as advertised, being primarily a tool for the user. Whether this will remain in the version 2.0 that is in the works, I cannot say as I have no access to it, although if someone is listening with an NDA nearby, I'd be more than happy to review it. Joe --------------------------------------------------------------------- The Cryptography Mailing List Unsubscribe by sending "unsubscribe cryptography" to majordomo@wasabisystems.com