* Rochkind's stability-from-being-paid and web-of-trust notions
I'm not sure I like being credited with the "stability from being paid" notion. I think there _is_ stability from being paid, but I think if the infrastructure depends on it, it's not a good infrastructure. The system should be able to create a stable top-level infrastructure on top of an inherently instable environment, with remailers going up and down, and popping into existence, and dying. It should route around dead remailers, like the internet itself.
Where email is used to transfer messages, the format used should be a subset of that specified in the SMTP RFCs. Restricting the structure of the headers would simplify the remailer software at little cost to the user.
The use of alt.x groups to exchange gateway information does not seem to add anything to this system; in fact it would seem to make it easier to spoof the system.
It _would_ make it easier to spoof the system, but I think it does add several very important things: 1) New remailers can easily announce themselves to the remailernet. [Whether they are to be trusted or not should depend on pgp-signed keys and web of trust, but the newsgroup provides an way to announce yourself to the system, and have that announcment by automatically dealt with by all participating parties] 2) Users (not people operating remailers, people using them) could make use of the newsgroup, to compile a database of remailers, and make long remailer chains. Users could have automated software doing this. [again, taking account of web-of-trust through signatures]. Messages posted to the newsgroup could include information on whether the remailer is free, or whether ecash is charged, and the user's software could automatically take account of this, enclosing ecash certificates in the proper encryption blocks for for-profit remailers. (and reporting costs to user for approval, of course). These are really two facets of the one problem, of allowing a user or remailer who has just arrived on the seen to quickly get a list of remailers, and make use of them, all automatically. That's sort of the super-set problem which encompasses the other two, and whose solution solves the other two. I don't think it's a coincidence that the newsgroup system solves these two problems at the expense of security (the newsgroup makes it easier to spoof). I have a gut feeling that any solution which solves these problems is going to be at the expense of security. But I think these two problems need to be solved if we want to create an easy to use, low-human-maintance, infrastructure in a universe of hundreds of remailers. The fact is, that even remailers exchanging mail _can_ be spoofed, if not quite as easily as the newsgroup idea. It seems to be a premise of cryptographic protocols and schemes, that you've got to assume a worst case and get a system working where even under the worst case, everything works. I think this is a good way to work, and that's why you've got to assume that if it can be spoofed, it will be spoofed. And you've got to build in a web of trust relying on cryptographically secure signatures, instead of relying on false security you get from thinking that it hasn't been spoofed just because it would be a little bit dificult to do so. Once you adopt this frame of mind, the newsgroup method is just as secure as the mail method (both can be spoofed, but you rely on web-of-trust to prevent spoofing from doing any harm), but the newsgroup method solves the two problems I brought up. I agree that it seems a good idea for the SMTP RFCs to be used to exchnage info, and we could post to the alt.remailernet newsgroup with articles that adhere to the SMTP RFCs, even though that isn't exactly what the those RFCs are intended for. Although we almost certainly need some agreed upon standards in addition to the SMTP RFCs, because there is additional information we want to exchange.