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"rick" == rick hoselton <hoz@univel.telescan.com> writes:
rick> On another note, timing attacks would not seem to work rick> against most DES implementations, hardware or software. The rick> time to execute each round does not seem to depend on the rick> plaintext or the key. It could be made to, of course, but rick> unless I'm missing something, the "natural" way to code it, rick> or to construct hardware for it, is not time dependent. Someone mentioned measuring power consumption instead of execution time. I think the same statistics should apply in that case. Of course this attack requires knowledge of the chip design, but that should be possible to gain. It's certainly easier than reading information from a protected EEPROM. Andreas -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 Comment: Processed by Mailcrypt 3.4, an Emacs/PGP interface iQCVAgUBMNCQGEyjTSyISdw9AQEt6wP+LWttWh2i9S8G/zvjU0cM0Rcw4uA/JGRo Qb0QrTfEZ6NI/oCWe4JTZCEQCgGZJ9ApoZMERHTGi4568dD3Cn3jZCkGVYfbeYxq ShOij0DaxkrjaRTsRgmhHVainB1bv5JE3heXYYRgGTLIDkclGtayz8VON3Yr7Oop mSBr/Fot5B4= =YOEs -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----