-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Tim May pondered:
And even that last remailer may be able to claim ignorance (and win in court) if he can show that what he mailed was unreadable to him, i.e., encrypted to the recipient. (This is another reason I favor a goal of "everyone a remailer.")
The only problem I see with the "everyone a remailer" concept is that, in the presence of traffic analysis, a locally generated message will show up as an imbalance between incoming and outgoing messages, will it not?
With canonical remailers, and no logging, earlier remailers should be safe.
That brings up an interesting point -- does the very act of logging remailing activity, specifically the recording of sources and destinations of forwarded messages perhaps open the operator up to INCREASED liability? IOW, if the remailer is being used in the furtherance of a "crime", the presence of a log which records the details of such traffic might be used as an argument that the operator "should have known" that suspicious, possibly illegal, activity was going on and possibly being considerd CRIMINALLY NEGLIGENT for not stopping it. Has he/she torpedoed any possibility of a "Sgt. Schultz" ("I know nuuuuthing!") defense by gathering detailed evidence and then not acting on it? Perhaps "Don't ask, don't tell" is a better policy... Also, I suspect that if increased activity on a remailer is useful in thwarting traffic analysis, then foreswearing the keeping of logs should serve to INCREASE the throughput as users gain confidence that any "footprints" they might leave behind are promptly erased. -- Diogenes -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6 iQCVAgUBLkmVwORsd2rRFQ1JAQF8OAQAlQW2ft75QMkxxWR1FMBaz7ja7C+o1uuH aK4yEBfJ3uHIuzIPyfNbtat6hWF1JV8Ip1uAgVae/MSe/Eeu54uMnh9CgdtK+NW3 3LdO9qMH+4YazACh+VnFCdqJmenOxjRnqHlqcQlVrGW/oqiiWIyF3cLUPGYvsvMd SOysxBS3SDU= =u3TC -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----