I'd like to make sure I understand how a digital mix works. I've read Chaum's paper on it, but hey, there's a reason why I don't have a Phd in spite of having all the coursework done. It seems like it solves two separate problems: 1) foiling traffic analysis, and 2) foiling a cheater remailer. The problems are separate, really, because if you really, really trust the remailer (as many people do Julf), then 2) isn't a problem. All you need to do is solve 1. Or, you can solve 1) by using a single remailer. A necessary but not sufficient step to foil traffic analysis is to strip headers. If you trust any one remailer, then you needn't bother using any other ones (assuming that remailer has enough traffic, delay, mixing, etc to foil traffic analysis). There's no real difference between using a set (N>1) of trusted remailers and using only one, because you can consider the set of remailers to be a single remailer from the point of view of traffic analysis. But to be sure, at least one of your remailers MUST attempt to foil traffic analysis, otherwise you're effectively mistrusting the remailer operators but trusting the NSA (or FBI). As I said a month or two ago, you MUST assume that the spooks are watching all the remailers. It's cheap and easy, therefore it's being done. Sorry for the Crypto 101, but I figure that there are other people out there who don't understand it. -- -russ <nelson@crynwr.com> http://www.crynwr.com/crynwr/nelson.html Crynwr Software | Crynwr Software sells packet driver support | ask4 PGP key 11 Grant St. | +1 315 268 1925 (9201 FAX) | What is thee doing about it? Potsdam, NY 13676 | What part of "Congress shall make no law" eludes Congress?