While browsing through the program for the 6th annual ACM-SIAM SODA (http://www.netlib.org/confdb/soda95/prog.html), which concludes today in SF, I noticed the following scheduled for this morning: 8:55 Trustee-based Tracing Extensions to Anonymous Cash and the Making of Anonymous Change Ernie Brickell, Peter Gemmell and David Kravitz, Sandia National Laboratories, Albuquerque I haven't been able to find a pointer to an actual paper, but I did find an abstract of sorts at http://www.cs.sandia.gov/HPCCIT/el_cash.html. Their proposal purports to elaborate the notion of GAK ("key escrow") to cover an otherwise-anonymous ecash system, according to my reading of this. Caveat emptor. Here's an extended excerpt of the doublespeech: "We introduce the first electronic cash system that incorporates trustee-based tracing, while provably protecting user anonymity. This effort expands on provably anonymous electronic cash systems. Our system maintains completely provable user anonymity with the exception that, only with the cooperation of several publicly appointed trustees (e.g. key-escrow agents), the government can trace a user's spending with certainty, determining to whom the user gave his/her money and how much s/he gave. The trustees can answer the question of whether a particular payment was made by a particular user, without revealing any additional information. This allows for authorized forward and backward tracing that does not impinge on the privacy of anyone other than the parties of the one transaction in question. Some of our trustee-based tracing require no tamper-resistant hardware, and all can be implemented as either on-line or off-line systems." Electronic cash is a subject of great economic, political, and research importance. With advances in computer networks, in processor speed, and in databases, and with advances in note counterfeiting technology and with both individuals' and businesses' desire for remote and more convenient financial transactions, some forms of electronic cash are likely to become widespread within 5 to 10 years. Although unconditionally anonymous electronic cash systems have been proposed in the literature, governmental and financial institutions are unwilling to back a completely anonymous system. Their reasons for opposing complete untraceability have to do with the containment of user fraud and the desire to restrict the new kinds of crime that unrestricted, remotely withdrawable, and spendable electronic cash could facilitate. Because of the necessary concern over crime control, they have previously proposed systems with little or no protection for the users' privacy. Our system provides the capability required by government for crime control while maintaining privacy for all other users." -L. Futplex McCarthy; PGP key by finger or server; I'm seeking an internship/ job for summer 1995 --- BS CS Cornell / 2 yrs. MS-level work in algebraic algorithms, Ph.D. planned --- send private email for resume etc.