[In this post I'll explore an interesting use of P-K methods to allow physical objects to be digitally signed.] Alan (wex@media.mit.edu) forwards to us a clipping and bets that no encryption is used:
[The following was snipped from EDUPAGE, the online summary service. Anyone have access to more information? --AW]
AND OPTICAL FINGERPRINTS. The National Registry uses an optical scanning technology to create and compare digital maps of the finger surface. The map can be converted to a modified bar code for inclusion on a wallet ID card. The information can also be encoded on circuitry inside a credit or debit card. (Tampa Tribune 2/20/94 B&F1)
I'm not familiar with this, but I'll bet public key crypto is used. Or it certainly _could_ be used. How it could be used is an interesting example of using public key methods for authentication. So, even if these National Registry folks are not using P-K crypto, here's an example of how this could work: Imagine that one has a object--a fingerprint, a photograph, a dollar bill, a factory-made automobile part--which one wants to "sign," to protect against forgery. (The application to manufactured goods is obvious: lower-quality parts are often made by forgers and sold as factory parts. The counterfeiting application is also obvious. Ditto for the photo, even with digital scanning....for reasons that will become clearer. The application to fingerprints I'll leave for you to think about.) Call this thing "the original object." It will have variations in surface appearance (or deeper, in principle, but I'll just stick to surface features). For example: - dollar bills: variations in paper fibers, in flecks of particles, in surface roughness, etc. - auto parts: scratches and tool marks on smooth surfaces, metal grains, etc. - fingerprints: whorls - photos: grains will vary from photo to photo How can one "sign" these objects in an unforgeable way? 1. Scan some part of the object, e.g., a linescan between two reference points. An intensity variation of reflected light, for example, will produce a vector of intensity variations. (What resolution, how many points taken, the location of reference marks, etc, are all details of vendor implementation.) 2. Take this feature vector and encrypt it to the *private* key of the factory or other authenticating agent. The resulting number is stamped on the object. (In the case of "Light Signatures," an L.A.-based company which was proposing this scheme several years ago, the manufacturer of parts would stamp the resulting number on the finished part--and perhaps include it with the paperwork for the part. Harley-Davidson was supposedly considering the use of this, as they were having big problems with counterfeit replacement parts. Jim Omura, Presidende of Cylink, a Public Key Partner, told me this in 1988. I haven't heard any more about "Light Signatures.") 3. The shop or customer wishing to authenticate the part takes the number stamped on the part, runs it through the *public* key of the manufacturer (widely available, not kept secret, of course) and gets back the feature vector, which he can then compare to what he actually sees on the object. (This clearly requires similar hardware to what was originally used by the manufacturer. And some tolerance for variations in intensity caused by equipment variations, wear, new scratches, etc., is needed. Not a really big problem, fortunately. You can fill in the details of what would be needed for fingerprints, for phots, for lottery tickets, for currency, etc.) 4. A would-be forger cannot generate a "digital object signature" that correctly decrypts through the published public key. Thus, the manufacturer or authenticator (whoever knows the private key corresponding to the public key) can "sign" his work and no one else can. This has obvious applications for authenticating paintings, original photographs (physical photos, not digital ones!), money, objects, etc. Anything in which natural variations can be converted into a very-hard-to-duplicate feature vector. This issue is also related to "is-a-person" credentialling in various ways. One might imagine Big Brother issuing ID cards in which fingerprints, retinal scans, facial features, etc., are encrypted with a private key. Any local cop or "checkpoint" (border, random stops, whatever) could then do the authentication locally. As with other uses of public key encryption--in contrast to symmetric ciphers, as we discussed earlier today--the private key is held safely and securely (presumably) and the field users don't run the risk of compromising security. I've wondered why this technology has not appeared in the six years since I first heard about it. Seems like a wonderful market niche. And I wonder how this fits in with Clipper and Capstone. After all, if the government holds escrowed digital signature keys as well, they could forge these items as well. Maybe that's what they want. --Tim May -- .......................................................................... Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay@netcom.com | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero 408-688-5409 | knowledge, reputations, information markets, W.A.S.T.E.: Aptos, CA | black markets, collapse of governments. Higher Power: 2^859433 | Public Key: PGP and MailSafe available. "National borders are just speed bumps on the information superhighway."