On Sun, 1 Jan 2006, Tyler Durden wrote: A couple of points trouble me here, to wit: (1) We are describing encryptedmessage sent over the public internet - granted, it's in "pieces", yet it's still sent into the public cloud; (2) These various pieces are all "record" communications as far as NSA/Echelon is concerned, and therefore we should expect that they will draw significant attention - and end up in permanent archives; (3) Since all off the pieces have been stored - including both the encrypted messagetexts and the decryptors, what is to prevent a time-faking attack against this message? After all, if you have all the parts, you can just "reinstantiate" the network as it was was the messages were originally sent. (4) For any form of time-destruction messaging to really work, the keying information would have to be tied to a physical <something> that cannot be reclaimed, and which decays at a fixed, known, and closely approximatable rate (a radiodecay probably doesn't meet this criteria); Every time-sensitive auto-destructing system Ive seen discussed here fails these weaknesses. -- Yours, J.A. Terranson sysadmin@mfn.org 0xBD4A95BF 'The right of self defence is the first law of nature: in most governments it has been the study of rulers to confine this right within the narrowest limits possible. Wherever standing armies are kept up, and the right of the people to keep and bear arms is, under any colour or pretext whatsoever, prohibited, liberty, if not already annihilated, is on the brink of destruction.' St. George Tucker