The "attack" assumes that the targeted hidden service is running a Tor relay. On Wed, 2012-10-03 at 16:52 +0200, Eugen Leitl wrote:
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From: Webmaster <webmaster@felononline.info> Date: Wed, 03 Oct 2012 09:50:02 -0400 To: tor-talk@lists.torproject.org, tor-relays-request@lists.torproject.org Subject: [tor-talk] clockskewer attack User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64; rv:15.0) Gecko/20120912 Thunderbird/15.0.1 Reply-To: tor-talk@lists.torproject.org
Found some interesting news on reddit. I dont know the tech behind it, but is sounds like playing with Clock allows you to get the IP address of the hidden service
http://www.reddit.com/r/onions/comments/10usgv/clock_skewing_a_clever_unconv... ntional_means_of/
Is this something to be worried about? _______________________________________________ tor-talk mailing list tor-talk@lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk
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