Ian Grigg wrote:
(Similar to GSM's. That is hard to attack, there is AFAIR no 'trival' attack, [...]
Just wait a little while. By the way, one can already buy fake base stations that mount man-in-the-middle attacks on GSM as a way to eavesdrop on GSM calls. It's off the shelf, but it costs ridiculous amounts of money.
Now, it seems that the US standards didn't get even that.
Right. The major barrier is the need for a digital scanner (which indeed is a major barrier against certain threat models, but not a barrier for other threat models).
And, market forces and all that, one would think that this would happen in due course.
I'm less optimistic. Market forces being what they are, one would expect that one would quickly get cellphones that are *claimed* and *perceived* to be more secure, regardless of their true merits or demerits. Oh wait, that already happened.