In an effort to make creating more traffic for the Cypherpunks remailers easier, I have added a feature to my remailer.
Do you mean easier to create more flow to thwart analysis or easier for an observer to determine which messages it does not need to examine after reaching a certain line in the header. This seems like a nice effort, but will not deter traffic analysis in the slightest. Headers are always unencrypted, so anyone watching the flow will be able to write a 3 line perl script to filter out all of these messages and there is nothing a header line can do to hide this discard information. What might be more usefull is a counter that signals the remailer system to stop passing a message and unwrap part of the message and act upon the instructions there; thus the counter would let tell the system how long to bounce the message around internally and when the counter hits zero it could send the message on to the target. For example you could create a little MIME x-anon-remailer body part that contains lines with the the final destination wrapped in the remailer pubkeys. When the counter hits zero the remailer checks the x-anon-remailer body part of the line that matches its pubkey, decrypts that line to get the final address and then sends the message on. In this sort of system all you would really need to do is send someone a message with your destination address wrapped in one anon remailer pubkey. When Alice replies to Bobs message she includes the x-anon-remailer body part which has the line provided by Bob (or several it Bob provides more than one). Alice sends this message to any remailer entry point and the message gets bounced around the system until the counter hits 0. At this point the remailer checks to see if it can decrypt any of the destination lines, if not it ups the counter by one (and maybe sets a TTL counter so that messages that have destination keys corrupted do not float forever...) and tosses it back into the system, if it can decrypt one of the destination keys it sends the message off to the address Bob has provided inside the destination key (Bob could even have the destination key send it the message into another remailer system if he is sufficiently paranoid). This would make traffic analysis much harder because once the message enters the remailer system it bounces around so much; the remailers become a black box that deliver the message without really knowing anythign about it until the last phase of delivery. This would also not waste bandwidth moving useless messages around. jim