-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- In list.cypherpunks, tcmay:
PGP gurus,
I don't follow the ins and outs of PGP very closely, and I can't find anything on this directly in my archived articles.
Someone has told me that pre-MIT versions of PGP may have compromised security because "the session key is hashed solely from the plaintext."
Is this true? What's the significance? Is there any weakness?
It's not true. The MD5 hash of the plaintext is used as a part of the overall session key generation, if available. Here's a comment from ~/pgp23/src/crypto.c: /* Now we have to generate a random session key and IV. As part of this computation, we use the MD5 hash of the current file, if it has previously been obtained due to a signing operation. If it has not been obtained, we hash the first 2K (for efficiency reasons) for input into the key generatrion process. This is to ensure that capturing a randseed.bin file will not allow reconstruction of subsequent session keys without knowing the message that was encrypted. (A session key only protects a single message, so it is reasonable to assume that an opponent trying to obtain a session key is trying to obtain, and thus is ignorant of, the message it encrypts.) This is not perfect, but it's an improvement on how session keys used to be generated, and can be changed in future without compatibility worries. */ The hash of the current file is combined with the contents of randseed.bin. Looks like the hash value is being used to gain a few bits of entropy that can't be recovered from randseed.bin alone. Checking the 2.6 code, I find the MD5 of the current file is used in the random session key generation, but slightly differently: * The MD5 of the current file is used to "prewash" the random numbers, * to make it more difficult for an attacker to predict the output. If the key were solely hashed from the plaintext, that could make for some known-plaintext attacks. But since a new session key is used each time, there doesn't seem to be much value in it. As it is, I don't see a problem with the session key generation using the file hash as a part of its entropy. Then again, could an IDEA session key be recovered by a known-plaintext attack? If so, could a known-plaintext attack then be made against RSA? (for that matter, is RSA vulnerable at all to known-plaintext attack?) - -- Roy M. Silvernail | #include <stdio.h> | PGP 2.3 public roy@sendai.cybrspc.mn.org | main(){ | key available | int x=486; | upon request | printf("Just my '%d.\n",x);} | (send yours) -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6 iQCVAwUBLhiMeRvikii9febJAQH/GQP8C/fNNkxlhz1vMnyNbyxdT9UeMUKrE4I8 bmyfWYSV9RxBQZR6OA2tU2hUWiX5Yvycn/IYYmxYbFEkio1zDSRuhit3svB1LPQY lzBhkaf+Uqjl7zx5HFD7ON+0kjr8D01r4g+HQceQwep4jOWTXZ/OZKas/aiOqhH7 Pv08H0BEpps= =ZtUN -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----