-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- [ To: cypherpunks ## Date: 10/30/97 ## Subject: Kyl's internet gambling bill ]
Date: Wed, 29 Oct 1997 13:31:21 -0800 From: Steve Schear <azur@netcom.com> Subject: Re: Kyl S-474 Anti-Gambling Bill passes committee
[Stuff about Kyl's anti-internet gambling bill.]
Prediction: this bill will be about as effective as outlawing spring.
About 20% of gamblers are 'problem' types who now regularly game illegally and could careless about the penalties. Once all on-line casinos offer real and 'play-money' wagering and strong crypto it will be neigh impossible for the Feds to know or prove which players are wagering real money and therefore gambling. Once Onion and Crowds routers are operational and widespread the Feds won't even be able to find the casinos, and even if they do they may not be able to shut them down (especially if they are built in a distributed fasion).
I always find these laws entertaining. In Missouri, we have state-run gambling in the lottery system, and state-licenced gambling on the riverboat casinos. Our Attorney General has been very vocal about shutting down internet casinos, to protect Missouri's citizens from being exploited. His concern for the welfare of problem gamblers in our state is touching. Odd that he isn't worried about those same citizens being taken advantage of by the in-state operations. Of course, the real issue here isn't about protecting citizens from themselves, or even about keeping citizens from being cheated by the electronic equivalent of weighted dice. It's about protecting the financial interests of those who now benefit from having local gambling monopolies. The state gets quite a bit of money from the lottery, and the companies that have invested in building riverboat casinos here are surely concerned about potential competition via the internet. The cities that have riverboat casinos typically get some part of the money made from them, which nicely brings those city governments into line. Presumably, something similar is happening with various states' Indian Reservations opening casinos. It's an interesting side-point that really anonymous communications and payment systems applied to gambling systems mean not only that *governments* can't shut down competing gambling schemes, but also that organized crime can't shut them down, whether through influencing corrupt governments to try to shut them down, or through direct action. Ob Crypto: There are cryptographic gambling protocols that can be verified (given some set of assumptions about underlying operations) to be fair. Thus, it's possible for a gambling operation to make their client software freely available in source, and allow people to see what it does and review it for fairness. If you find a reviewer or two you trust, you can ask them to digitially sign the executable they got when they compiled the code, and refuse to use any other code. This gives you a level of certainty that you're not being cheated by weighted dice that you simply can't get in physical casinos. (Sure, government agencies inspect those casinos, but the inspectors aren't incorruptible, and they can't be everywhere at once.) For a simple example, consider a situation where Alice and Bob need to agree on a shared seed. Assume they already have established a secure (encrypted and authenticated) session. They can easily generate a new shared seed by doing something like this: 1. Alice generates random R_0 and sends hash(R_0) to Bob. 2. Bob generates random R_1 and sends hash(R_1) to Alice. 3. Alice sends R_0 to Bob. 4. Bob sends R_1 to Alice. 5. Alice and Bob each generate their shared seed, R_0 XOR R_1. If the hash function doesn't leak information about its inputs, and if it is collision-resistant, then this protocol should work. If either party generates a random number, then the resulting seed is random, regardless of the other party's input. (You still have to work out administrative issues, like what happens when communications fail conveniently just after Alice sends Bob R_0, but these are easy enough to solve.)
--Steve
--John Kelsey, Counterpane Systems, kelsey@counterpane.com PGP 2.6 fingerprint = 4FE2 F421 100F BB0A 03D1 FE06 A435 7E36 -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQCVAwUBNFje6UHx57Ag8goBAQEsZQP/TWqpL70gThhETuqDlrTJsCCy5PeTMNte t0tzg8fwPFK3cESSN+5ndRAjUXmdS8dmNZW1U8RcDFpH8YRd1uAfJ4CdmMrK8zgk OGcegYoSDgwtdLw43Zslx88nl7OgkfvyQqzZZmDkWwyXn0g1RMLcTVt8nyccm6O+ WPH3VLc+7Ho= =H+YB -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- --John Kelsey, Counterpane Systems, kelsey@counterpane.com PGP 2.6 fingerprint = 4FE2 F421 100F BB0A 03D1 FE06 A435 7E36