On Sun, Aug 05, 2001 at 04:07:14PM +0300, Sampo Syreeni wrote:
Now, the above is of course fiction, for now at least. But keeping such widescale attacks on the infrastructure part of the threat model is not, IMHO, a bad idea. The discussions on stego, disposable remailers, physical broadcast technology and the like are part of that, and serve to lay the groundwork in case shit one day does hit the fan.
Last I checked, the vast bulk of remailers were in North America and Europe. Given sufficient provocation (Bush twins kidnapped, Osama talking biochemwomdterror in DC), I could easily see a coordinated set of pre-dawn raids to "gather evidence" and seize computers as part of a criminal investigation. Obviously the servers would have to be held as potential evidence for a trial - did they keep logs? our techs will find out - which could take a decade. This would cripple the current remailer network and generate almost no public outcry beyond the cypherpunks and such. -Declan