From: John Young <jya@pipeline.com>
Crypto emissary David Aaron gave a speech today in Germany boosting US encryption policy for privacy and commerce. Says it's an insult to claim US intelligence agencies want backdoor access and other untrue myths:
A prime example of DoubleThink, since Key Recovery == backdoor access. # http://jya.com/aaron101398.htm # # Clearly, a balance must be struck between the needs of businesses and # consumers and the protection of society as a whole. What is the # answer? We believe the answer lies in cryptographic systems that # provide trustworthy security services along with lawful access. By # lawful access, I refer to a range of technologies designed to permit # the plain text recovery of encrypted data and communications under a ^^^^^^^^ # court order or other lawful means that safeguards civil liberties. In other words, they believe in cryptographic systems with backdoor access. The NSA testified to Congress concerning lawful access: : The Puzzle Palace : Inside the National Security Agency, : America's most secret intelligence organization : Author James Bamford, 1983 revision, ISBN 0-14-00.6748-5 : : P381-382: NSA Director General Allen testified to Congress that there is no : statute that prevents the NSA from interception of domestic communications. : Asked whether he was concerned about the legality of expanding greatly its : targeting of American citizens, the NSA replied: "Legality? That particular : aspect didn't enter into the discussions." The government's idea of "lawful access" is "anywhere, anytime". # http://jya.com/aaron101398.htm # # We are not wedded to any single technology approach. Key management # infrastructures, key recovery and other recoverable products that # provide lawful access are some of the ways to achieve a reasonable # balance. We believe that seeking industry-led, market-based solutions # is the best approach to helping law enforcement. Oh dey do do dey? : From owner-firewalls-outgoing@GreatCircle.COM Wed May 14 18:54:15 1997 : Received: from osiris (osiris.nso.org [207.30.58.40]) by ra.nso.org : (post.office MTA v1.9.3 ID# 0-13592) with SMTP id AAA322 : for <firewalls@GreatCircle.COM>; Wed, 14 May 1997 12:56:13 -0400 : Date: Wed, 14 May 1997 12:58:46 -0400 : To: firewalls@GreatCircle.COM : From: research@isr.net (Research Unit I) : Subject: Re: Encryption Outside US : : I was part of that OECD Expert Group, and believe I may shine at least : some light on what exactly was said and happened at the meetings. : : The main conflict during all sessions was the demand of the US to be : able to decrypt anything, anywhere at any time versus the European : focus: we want to have the choice - with an open end - to maintain : own surveillance. The US demand would have caused an immediate : ability to tap into what the European intelligence community believes to : be its sole and exclusive territory. In fact the Europeans were not at all : pleased with the US view points of controlling ALL crypto. Germany and : France vigorously refused to work with the US on this issue. : : ... the Australian and UK views that felt some obligation : from the 1947 UKUSA treaty (dealing with interchange of intelligence). : : Bertil Fortrie : Internet Security Review The US Government insists on the capability "to decrypt anything, anywhere at any time" he said. Gosh, that doesn't sound like they believe "market-based solutions" are the best approach, does it? * http://epic.org/crypto/ban/fbi_dox/impact_text.gif * * SECRET FBI report * * NEED FOR A NATIONAL POLICY * * A national policy embodied in legislation is needed which insures * that cryptography use in the United States should be forced to be * crackable by law enforcement, so such communications can be monitored * with real-time decryption. * * All cryptography that cannot meet this standard should be prohibited. No it don't, do it? : * "Above the Law" : * ISBN 0-684-80699-1, 1996 : * by David Burnham : * : * The suspicion that the government might one day try to outlaw any : * encryption device which did not provide easy government access was : * reinforced by comments made by FBI Director Freeh at a 1994 Washington : * conference on cryptography. "The objective for us is to get those : * conversations...wherever they are, whatever they are", he said in : * response to a question. : * : * Freeh indicated that if five years from now the FBI had solved the : * access problem but was only hearing encrypted messages, further : * legislation might be required. Anywhere, anytime. ---guy "Easy access".