On Wed, 27 Sep 2000, Riad S. Wahby wrote:
Not at all. The distinction is in the same vein as the distinction between talking about something and actually doing it.
I.e. you both evaluate actions as such, I tend to evaluate them based on their consequences. [Snip on intrusiveness of regulation of action and inaction]
The latter are, for Gil, for me, and for most people on this list, unacceptable.
I know and I appreciate the viewpoint in question. I raised some mild doubts about it and apparently have to bear the consequences, now...
the worms in this can quickly. Restrictions on the negative liberty in question (that is, _not_ to associate with someone) are obviously more intrusive than laws that limit positive liberties (e.g. the liberty to kill your neighbor).
I do not see the essential difference. I see that as an axiom which need not hold. OTOH, no point in debating axioms...
This statement tells me that there is no common ground between you and Gil, or between you and me. Gil and I start from the assumption that you have liberties that the government cannot take away, while you seem to be coming from the perspective that the government gives its people certain liberties, but that liberty comes from nowhere else but government. Perhaps it's not even worth it to argue any more.
Actually I subscribe to neither view. I see rights as something that do not naturally exist, but are purely a societal product, subject to change through redefinition. Whether this happens because the government effects it or if the people start to view something as an inherent right is, to me, immaterial. I also have trouble with argumentation which starts from a clean slate, since such a thing does not exist in reality.
I put forth this explanation: shared resources are those resources to which it is impossible to restrict access. A lighthouse built on the coast and the radio spectrum are both examples of shared resources.
If everybody around you decides your shop is now a shared resource, it will be, by your definition. Since I view rights as highly relative, you cannot even call this thievery.
No, not at all. A shopkeeper who owns a private shop has the right to sell only to certain people and not to others, and the distinction the shop owner makes between those he will sell to and those he will not is his alone to make.
If you do not define commerce as a shared resource, which in some cases just might be sensible.
But why not? Why is this different from forcing a shop owner to sell to people he would not otherwise serve? It seems that if I cannot limit your right to speak, even if I can't escape the sound of your voice, you can't limit my right not to sell food to you even if it means you will starve.
Because I evaluate based on the outcome. In the first case, the sound bugs you if it bugs you. (And yes, in some cases the damage could be enough to regulate the speech. This is, thankfully, rare.) In the second case you die. There is a conflict of interests and I rank. Admittedly you could place the value of the right to exist below that of not having to listen to someone and resolve this particular problem. I think it would be problematic elsewhere.
You say his _in_action is an undue burden on you. I say that your request for his action is an undue burden on him.
Yep, this is the difference in viewpoint. I do not view regulation of inaction as fundamentally different from the regulation of action, relying instead on the consequences of each to resolve possible conflicts. Perhaps we will get to burying this thread before I acquire the reputation of being a troll beyond rescue...
You have a right to life. You do not have the right not to die. There is a difference. Neither I nor anyone else have to sustain your life; all that is required of our respecting your right not to die is that we don't kill you.
And again. I am, under some circumstances, ready to regulate inaction whereas you are not. Sampo Syreeni <decoy@iki.fi>, aka decoy, student/math/Helsinki university