-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- In article <199510301925.VAA27116@grumble.grondar.za>, Mark Murray <mark@grondar.za> wrote:
Something I didn't mention earlier; we felt that letting the unwashed masses read /dev/*random was not a good idea, as they could deplete the pool of entropy all to easily for attack purposes.
That's really just a DOS attack, isn't it? An application that needs true randomness should be using /dev/random, which you can slow but not disturb, and an application that is using /dev/urandom should be ok with less than full entropy. -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQCVAwUBMJVTqeyjYMb1RsVfAQGqYwP/W6xUdsxwCMrWlvmuPrfV4yfaYpZWt3JW /ld8HsqyQt5XRkbNwq/hcXDle13exEaqzXe2l6qHtR3qySEaU/4WF/BgSTwqpQa+ iA6p8KL51XPluNF9oagMrmOR2J4yxMPldrx5m/+WcZRJj4mdfzxQoMQ9J4agTVsC l2spGY8iNkA= =9cfz -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- -- Shields.