At 11:15 AM 11/22/2001 -0800, David Honig wrote:
At 08:46 PM 11/21/01 -0800, Petro
wrote:
> No.
Libertarians are for "free markets", which are inherently
>capitalistic in nature, but the reverse is not true. There are
many
>*wealthy* capitalists who are all for strongly regulated markets and
>high barriers to entry. One could argue that they are not
Capitalists.
Those are philosophical parasites. Like a congressvermin who
campaigns
on liberty and once in office destroys it.
A good recent example is Warren Buffett calling for an FDIC-style
government insurance against terrorism. In the sweet name of
self-interest he proposes that the government increase existing insurance
moral hazards by forcing all citizens to underwrite those who have chosen
to live or work in higher risk areas.
http://www0.mercurycenter.com/premium/opinion/columns/terror20.htm
I'M in the insurance business -- an expensive
place to be in the past couple of months. It was made costly for
Berkshire Hathaway, the company I run, because I did something very dumb:
allowed Berkshire to provide insurance coverage for a huge catastrophe
loss without its getting a premium for doing so. The risk we unthinkingly
assumed was a loss from terrorism.
Given the degree of my error, I was lucky: We estimate our Sept. 11 loss
at Berkshire to have been ``only'' about $2.3 billion. That's more, by
far, than we've ever lost from a single catastrophe, but the toll could
have been far larger. Indeed, had a nuclear device been available to
Osama bin Laden, the loss could have bankrupted most of the insurance
industry.
A potential loss of almost infinite magnitude can be assumed only by an
entity of almost-infinite resources. That entity doesn't exist in the
private sector. Only the U.S. government fits the bill.
Washington has accepted this proposition to a point. Congress is now
agonizingly trying to create some sort of industry-government coalition
that would insure losses from terrorism.
Some proposals limit the government's liability but leave the risk for
the industry open-ended. These proposals won't work: If unlimited
liability is left with insurers, they will necessarily refuse to renew
policies they see potentially leading them to bankruptcy.
Equally bad, all the proposals now being considered will engender pricing
based upon risk exposure: If a business is located in a high-risk spot,
it will be asked to pay a staggering price for insurance. Risk-based
pricing is normally equitable and desirable. In this case, though, it
would have anti-social consequences.
For example, the terrorism risk per dollar of insured value may be 10 or
more times for iconic or critical properties in New York City what it is
for properties in less-populated areas. But great cities are central to
our society. We don't want them to wither under the burden of hugely
disadvantageous insurance costs. Their citizens almost certainly bear
above-normal physical risks in the terrorist war being waged upon us; we
shouldn't impose crippling economic costs on them as well.
We should adopt the Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. as a model for where
we want to head in the insurance industry. The rationale for the FDIC,
formed 68 years ago, was clear-cut: The United States sorely needed to
eliminate bank runs and the financial panics they caused. Before the
FDIC, the risk from bank failures resided with depositors, who had no way
to shed it.
Neither they nor their banks could lay that risk off on private insurers
for two reasons. First, the dollar amounts involved were simply too
large; second, losses were correlated, in the sense that the failure of a
few banks frequently caused a chain reaction, toppling good banks with
bad, leaving a mountain of economic damage. Fortunately, these punishing
disruptions to our economy were ended by the advent of FDIC insurance.
Now, millions of business owners, individuals, landlords and lenders bear
the economic risk of terrorist attacks. Insurers won't assume the risk --
we were previously dumb, but we've learned. It isn't right, though, that
these risk-laden millions should have to shoulder this burden themselves.
If we were to adopt an FDIC model for handling terrorism, the insurance
industry would not be permitted to earn a dime from the coverage.
Instead, a premium tax, payable to the U.S. Treasury, would be levied on
all insurance. This would have the equitable effect of spreading the
terrorism-related cost to the country in general, just as we spread
defense expenditures.
Were such a proposal enacted, it should sharply limit private lawsuits
seeking to place blame on some party involved -- an airline, say. We
should want the Treasury to make payments to victims solely to compensate
them for loss of property, life or direct earnings, without worrying
about fault. The law also should cover war losses.
Some people will argue that an FDIC model for insurance would be a
socialistic intrusion into the private sector, yet that institution is
today generally regarded as having been enormously beneficial. Once, the
problem was bank runs and economic panics; we found an innovative
solution. Today, the problem is terrorism and its capricious effects on
insurance costs; we need a solution of comparable efficacy.
Warren Buffett is chairman of the board of Berkshire Hathaway Inc., a
diversified company with insurance operations, and a director of the
Washington Post Co., which has an investment in Berkshire Hathaway. This
was written for the Post.