On Wed, 2 Jul 1997, Kent Crispin wrote:
The Evil One can always masquerade as the next to the last remailer, with suitably altered date fields or whatever. I wasn't thinking in terms of traffic analysis -- I was thinking in terms of guaranteeing that the last remailer in the chain, the one that actually delivers the message, cannot be predicted in advance.
Well, to make the remailers more intelligent, have them count incoming mail from the list of remailers participating in the system. (either that or a rate) when one remailer seems to be sending much more mail than the others (which shouldn't happen if all remailers are randomly distributing the mail to each other) you automatically do the random forward to another remailer. There still exists a problem if a coordinated attack on the whole system occurs, with large amounts of mail seeking to discredit a group of remailers at once... ----------------------------------------------------------------------- Ryan Anderson - <Pug Majere> "Who knows, even the horse might sing" Wayne State University - CULMA "May you live in interesting times.." randerso@ece.eng.wayne.edu Ohio = VYI of the USA PGP Fingerprint - 7E 8E C6 54 96 AC D9 57 E4 F8 AE 9C 10 7E 78 C9 -----------------------------------------------------------------------