Timothy C. May wrote: | of crypto software, they try to limit the export of anything with "hooks" | for adding crypto outside the U.S., they try to limit export of crypto | knowledge, and here they're even trying to limit _signing_ software? | | What's next? Maybe they'll try to limit the dispensing of _legal advice_ by | U.S. attorneys to foreign clients. I'm not sure we should be discussing what's next, or how we'll monkey wrench it, before it comes out. Clipper I was mishandled. Clipper II was mishandled. Clipper III looked like it might have had a chance before the administration fumbled the ball with letting the FBI have a veto. Those folks do learn, and they may be learning from their presence here. The NIST meeting, which Pat Farrel reported on, had questions about not interacting with rouge applications, not super-encrypting a data stream, and other things that we talked about and reminded the Feds to deal with. I say let them propose; let them build systems. Then attack them. Why let them release proposals that already deal with our attacks? Incidentally, was Mykrotronix a cheap buy because they bought into Clipper? Is that what happens to companies that try to get all their nourishment from the GAK teat? Adam -- "It is seldom that liberty of any kind is lost all at once." -Hume