[IMAGE] Chapter VII: Libel Fault _________________________________________________________________ The Supreme Court has recognized different standards for different types of libel plaintiffs, with public officials and public figures required to show a high degree of fault. Celebrities and others with power in a community are usually considered public figures. Politicians and high-ranking government personnel are public officials. Courts generally consider public officials to include public employees who have substantial responsibility for or control over the conduct of governmental affairs. Some courts have found that public school teachers and police officers are public officials. But determining if other people are private or public figures is not always easy. In some instances, there may be overlapping in the private and public category. For example, a businessperson who has high visibility because of fundraising efforts in a community may or may not be a public figure for all purposes. A plaintiff who is considered a public figure or official must prove that the publisher or broadcaster acted with "actual malice" in reporting derogatory information. "Actual malice" does not mean ill will or intent to harm. Instead, the term applies to whether the defendant knew that the challenged statements were false or acted with reckless disregard of the truth. Courts may examine reporting procedures in testing for actual malice. While carelessness is not usually considered reckless disregard, ignoring obvious ways of substantiating allegations could be considered reckless. In Harte-Hanks Communications, Inc. v. Connaughton, the Supreme Court held that even an extreme deviation from professional standards, or the publication of a story to increase circulation, do not in themselves prove actual malice. The Court also said that while failure to investigate facts does not necessarily prove actual malice, a "purposeful avoidance of the truth" may. Use of quotations that are not literally accurate will not necessarily be considered proof of actual malice as long as the altered quotes do not materially change the meaning of the words the speaker used. In Masson v. The New Yorker Magazine, the Supreme Court acknowledged that some editing of quotations is often necessary, but refused to extend protection to all edits that are at least a "rational interpretation" of what the speaker said. If the plaintiff is a private litigant, he or she must at least prove that the publisher or broadcaster was negligent in failing to ascertain that the statement was false and defamatory. Some states may impose a higher burden on private-figure litigants, especially if the story in question concerns a matter of public importance. _________________________________________________________________ [INLINE] Back to Table of Contents [INLINE] Jump to next section in this chapter