I had an interesting thought. Remailer networks are hard to analyze, with messages whizzing this way and that. But Tim pointed out that if you have N messages coming in to the network as a whole and N going out, all that zigging and zagging really can't do much better than N-fold confusion. This suggests, that IF YOU COULD TRUST IT, a single remailer would be just as good as a whole net. Imagine that God offers to run a remailer. It batches messages up and every few hours it shuffles all the outstanding messages and sends them out. It seems to me that this remailer provides all the security that a whole network of remailers would. If this idea seems valid, it suggests that the real worth of a network of remailers is to try to assure that there are at least some honest ones in your path. It's not to add security in terms of message mixing; a single remailer seems to really provide all that you need. Hal