Twenty cypherpunks robbed a bank. They took 20 million bucks. Here's how they plan to split the money: they stay in line, and the first guy suggests how to split the money. Then they vote on his suggestion. If 50% or more vote for his proposal, his suggestion is adopted. Otherwise they kill the first robber and now it is the turn of guy #2 to make another splitting proposal. Same voting rules apply.
I don't know the final outcome, but I do have a couple of observations... - The person at the front of the line, making the suggestion, will always vote for his own proposal, if only to save his own life. This is obvious. - The second-to-last person is in an interesting position. If everyone before him is dead and he gets to the front of the line, he will decide that he gets _all_ of the money for himself. If there's only two people left, his own Yes vote for his own proposal makes 50% and he automatically gets all the money. This is the best possible deal for him. So, I think the second-to-last person will vote No to every proposal except his own, in an effort to force this situation. Now that I think about it, solving this 'game theory' scenario has some parallels to cryptanalysis (disclaimer: I am not a cryptanalyst). By pointing out the above properties, I've removed a couple of 'bits' from the 'search space'. ===================================================================== | Steve Reid - SysAdmin & Pres, EDM Web (http://www.edmweb.com/) | | Email: steve@edmweb.com Home Page: http://www.edmweb.com/steve/ | | PGP (2048/9F317269) Fingerprint: 11C89D1CD67287E68C09EC52443F8830 | | -- Disclaimer: JMHO, YMMV, TANSTAAFL, IANAL. -- | ===================================================================:)